

Kim Lane Scheppelle

How International Law
Can Restore Democracy

Volodymyr Kulyk

Ukrainian Identity
In Time of War

Radka Denemarková

Das aktuelle
Vermächtnis
der Dissidenz

Ludger Hagedorn

Philosophie
und der „Sinn“
des Krieges



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Randall Hansen, Achilles Kallergis, Ruslana Koziienko, Peggy Levitt*

Migration, Displacement, and Governance

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Editorial

Das Cover der vorliegenden Ausgabe ist der Portraitreihe ST. JAVELIN von Julia Krahn entnommen. Die Künstlerin hat geflüchtete Ukrainerinnen eingeladen, ihre Geschichten über Bilder und Interviews zu erzählen. Das Foto verweist zum einen auf die Essays von **Bialasiewicz** und **Biziukova**, **Koziienko** und **Lazareva**, die die Aufnahme ukrainischer Flüchtlinge in Europa behandeln, zum anderen auf Fragen von Migration, Vertreibung und Governance, den Schwerpunkt des Heftes. **Hansen** erläutert die von der Ölkrise 1973 ausgelösten Veränderungen, die gewaltige Migrationsströme zur Folge hatten. **Donà** und **Çağlar** identifizieren Aspekte der Kolonialität von Macht in der Governance von Migration. **Kallergis** fordert ein Reframing der Umweltmigration im Globalen Norden, während **Levitt** dramatische Verschiebungen in der sozialen Absicherung von Migrant:innen thematisiert.

Zwei Essays fokussieren auf die Ukraine: **Kulyk** weist auf Verschiebungen der ukrainischen Identität im Zuge des Krieges und **Shynkarenko** auf die Bedeutung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Krim-Tataren als Stabilitätsfaktors in der Region hin.

Eine Reihe von Essays haben Herausforderungen für die Demokratie zum Gegenstand. **Scheppele** hebt die Bedeutung des internationalen Rechts für die Stärkung demokratischer Strukturen hervor; **Özkan** zeigt, wie der westdeutsche Anti-Kommunismus die Islamisierung der türkischen Migrant:innen förderte. **Mineva** erörtert die lokale Adaption globaler Kulturkriege der Gegenwart; und **Hovhannisyán** geht auf die Förderung von Anti-Gender-Bewegungen in Europa durch Evangelikale der USA ein.

Die Jugend und nationale Minderheiten als politische Subjekte auf der Suche nach Vertretung bilden den Gegenstand der Beiträge von **Beilinson** bzw. **Germane**. Zwei weitere Essays fokussieren auf die Dissidenz Osteuropas. Während **Denemarková** dem Erbe der Dissidenz im heutigen China nachgeht, geht **Blagojević** auf die Entwicklung der jugoslawischen Dissidenz in Richtung Ethnonationalismus ein.

Spannenden Fragen widmen sich die philosophischen Essays: **Cartlidge** fragt, ob wir Martin Heidegger immer noch lesen dürfen; **Ktenas** erläutert, wie Cornelius Castoriadis sich der Wahrheit annähert; und **Hagedorn** umreißt den philosophischen Zugang zum Krieg.

Schließlich erinnert **Austins** Beitrag über das Attentat an König Zog von 1931 an eine eher unbekanntere Episode der Wiener Vergangenheit.

Im Namen des IWM wünsche ich Ihnen viel Freude beim Lesen. <

The photo on the cover of this issue is taken from the portrait series ST. JAVELIN by Julia Krahn. The artist invited Ukrainian women who have fled their country to tell their stories through images and interviews. The photo points to the essays by **Bialasiewicz** and **Biziukova**, **Koziienko**, and **Lazareva**—which discuss the reception of Ukrainian refugees in Europe—as well as to the issue's larger focus on migration, displacement, and governance. **Hansen** elaborates on the shifts brought about by the 1973 oil crisis, which resulted in massive migratory flows. **Donà** and **Çağlar** identify aspects of the coloniality of power in the governance of migration. **Kallergis** calls for a reframing of environmental migration in the Global North, while **Levitt** addresses dramatic shifts in the social protection of migrants.

Two essays focus on Ukraine, with **Kulyk** pointing to shifts in Ukrainian identity in the wake of the war and **Shynkarenko** to the importance of the Crimean Tatars' right to self-determination as a source of stability for the region.

Other essays focus on challenges to democracy. **Scheppele** highlights the importance of international law in strengthening democratic structures; **Özkan** shows how West German anti-communism has promoted the Islamization of Turkish migrants; **Mineva** discusses the local adaptation of contemporary global culture wars; and **Hovhannisyán** explores the promotion of anti-gender movements in Europe by evangelical organizations in the United States.

Youth and national minorities as political subjects in search of representation are the subject of essays by **Beilinson** and **Germane**, respectively. Two further essays address dissident intellectuals in late socialism. While **Denemarková** traces the legacy of East Central European dissidence in contemporary China, **Blagojević** addresses the adoption of ethnonationalist positions by some Yugoslav intellectuals.

Three essays address intriguing philosophical questions: **Cartlidge** tackles whether we may still read Martin Heidegger; **Ktenas** explains how Cornelius Castoriadis approached the question of truth; and **Hagedorn** offers a brief overview of a philosophical approach to war.

Finally, **Austin's** contribution on the 1931 assassination attempt on King Zog recalls a rather unknown episode from Vienna's past.

I hope you enjoy the read. <

Evangelos Karagiannis

OPEC, Oil Prices, and Global Migration since 1973

BY RANDALL HANSEN

The OPEC oil crisis restructured the global economy and geopolitics in a manner that generated over 100 million unexpected migrants.

Global migration is at a historic high: there are 281 million migrants globally, more or less evenly divided between the Global North and the Global South. Almost 40 percent are family migrants; the rest are asylum seekers, refugees, labor migrants, or some combination thereof. The boundaries between these categories are fluid: refugees or labor migrants come as family members, notably to the United States, when there are no other legal migration channels for them. Refugees become, willingly or not, laborers. And millions more, who do not appear in the statistics, come as undocumented migrants, crossing deserts, pushing through mountain ranges, and traversing oceans in rickety boats. Most global migrants are low-skilled, but because wealthy receiving countries fetishize high-skilled migration and deny their need for low-skilled labor, the majority of low-skilled migrants use smugglers, and many are trafficked. Thousands die yearly along the way: they drown in the Mediterranean, suffocate in lorries, and die of thirst in deserts.

Mass migration is politics, as an even casual glance at news outlets makes clear. It is also a puzzle. For this level of migration was neither expected nor, in the Global North, wanted. From the 1920s in the United States and the early 1970s in Europe, policymakers made every effort to end postwar labor migration schemes and to block new migration. Asylum applications in the late 1960s and early 1970s were a trickle. Western public opinion has for decades been resolutely hostile, Canada excepted, to current or higher levels of migration. As a result, global migration was meant, at best, to stagnate and, probably, to fall. Yet, since 1970 it has tripled in absolute terms and increased by 1.5 percent as a percentage of world population. This increase translates into well over 100 million people.

In explaining this development, scholars have cited family immigration, the ease of international travel with the arrival of long-range commercial aircraft, and increased violent conflict. None of these explanations is adequate. As noted, family migrants are a minority of total global migration, even when undocumented migration is not counted, and many family migrants are pushed or pulled by something other than the family. Few asylum seekers or undocumented migrants travel by plane; it is a foolish refugee or would-be low-skilled labor migrant who declares



Wrecked boats and thousands of life jackets used by refugees and migrants during their journey across the Aegean sea lie in a dump in Mithimna, Lesbos, on February 19, 2016.

themselves such when applying for a travel visa to North America, Australia, or Europe. Violent conflict has increased since the early 1970s and it is relevant, but citing it as an explanation of mass migration is question-begging: why?

In *War, Work and Want: How the OPEC Oil Crisis Caused Mass Migration and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), I argue that the economic and geopolitical changes unleashed by the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 set in motion processes that resulted in over 100 million unexpected and unwanted migrants. The oil-price surge resulted in a permanent halving of economic growth across the West. We went from a world in which American and European economic growth averaged 5 percent per year, and often hit 6–7 percent, to one in which it averaged 2.5 percent.

Outside the West, in the oil-poor countries of the Middle East such as Egypt and Syria, inflation generated by the oil crisis wrecked import substitution industrialization—the policy of nurturing domestic industries with well-paid working-class jobs behind a tariff wall. In response, under International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and U.S. pressure, Egypt, in the 1970s, and Syria, in the 1980s, embraced liberal capitalism.

The consequences were profound. In the West, the inflation-racked middle and upper-middle classes rebuilt their shattered living standards on the back of cheap labor. In the United States, with the active collusion of the state, firms defined inflation as a wage problem and destroyed the unions. In the Europe-

an Union, where unions remained stronger, firms went around them through the creative use of piecework and an EU directive allowing them to hire workers in any member state, to pay them wages and benefits found in their home country, and to have them work anywhere in the EU. Unremarkably, firms sought workers in Southern and Eastern Europe and posted them to Northern and Western Europe.

Working-class wages plummeted, taking workers' livelihoods, and sometimes lives, with them. In multiple sectors of the economy, unionized jobs disappeared and wages crumbled. Wages fell to the point where domestic workers were no longer prepared to accept them. Nationals exited the sectors affected by skilling up or leaving the labor market for unemployment and, all too often, alcohol and drug addiction. The "deaths of despair" of white working-class men through alcoholism, drug overdose, and suicide are inseparable from how capitalism restructured in the aftermath of the oil crisis.

In the Global South, the path was different but the destination the same. As later industrializers, the four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as Malaysia and Thailand had no golden age of unionization. Instead, they drew on an ample supply of cheap rural-to-urban migration to support export-led economic growth. They then turned to migrant labor from other Asian countries when that labor ran out (so did the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore, which never had the latter). Asian wealth

and consumer lifestyles are thus as dependent on exploited migrant labor as are those in the West.

In the Middle East, the embrace of neoliberalism by Egypt and Syria created flashy shows of wealth in hotels on the Nile and in glitzy storefronts on the streets of Damascus but also spiraling inequality and political opposition from which Islamists profited. Inequality, compounded by corruption, and political repression resulted in the mass protests of the 2011 Arab Spring. Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's threats of genocide resulted in the NATO bombing campaign that toppled his regime and unleashed a civil war resulting in 2.2 million refugees. In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad's brutal crackdown led to another civil war and the flight of some 7 million people.

In Iran, a sudden gush of oil money funded the Shah's military and his White Revolution, a rapid modernization program launched in 1963 and accelerated with post-embargo oil revenues. But it also unleashed forces he struggled to control, resulting in the Iranian Revolution. That revolution led to the second oil shock of 1979, which decided the Soviet Union, until then hesitant, to invade Afghanistan. When mujahideen resistance dashed Moscow's expectations of a quick victory, the Red Army launched an obliteration campaign against the countryside, designed to drive civilians into the cities, which it controlled, or out of the country. Both happened, with 5 million refugees fleeing to Iran and Pakistan. In Pakistan's refugee camps, Afghan boys who had lost everything

were schooled in anti-Shiite and anti-Western hate and misogyny by uneducated mullahs. They became the Taliban, who took power in Afghanistan, sheltering Osama bin Laden and enabling his September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Those attacks, and the United States' dependence on Middle Eastern oil, resulted in three U.S.-led military assaults: against Iraq in 1990 and 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001. The result was millions of refugees.

War has been one great driver of global migration over the last five decades. From 1973 to 2020, oil wars led to over 22 million refugees. In the same period, 94 million labor migrants moved to Asia, Europe, and the United States to work in six sectors: meat processing, agriculture, construction, retail, textiles and garments, and domestic labor. Their need for work, the second driver of migration, drew them into precarious, exploitative, and dangerous positions because any job is better than no job. Those jobs and their appalling conditions exist because of our want: the desire of consumers in rich countries for ever-cheaper products and services. The result is a structurally embedded, global migrant working class. The world economy is awash with documented and undocumented migrants driven by war, drawn by work, and destined to satisfy our insatiable consumerist wants. ◀

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From Climate Denialism to Migration Catastrophology

BY ACHILLES KALLERGIS

Far-right populism, which until recently disavowed climate change, has embraced apocalyptic scenarios of overwhelming numbers of migrants and refugees from the Global South fleeing environmental risk to seek refuge in Europe. Countering this misleading claim requires reframing environmental migration not as a threat to border security but as a localized consequence of climate change.

Perhaps more than any other issue today, climate migration engenders primal fears across the political spectrum. Driven by the juxtaposition of migration and climate change, with each already perceived as a threatening crisis, discussions emphasize the need for action given the prospect of unprecedented numbers of climate migrants and refugees in the future. Scenarios are equally fueled by the ever-present images of displaced populations fleeing extreme weather events and by wide-ranging forecasts of the number of people who will be moving for climate-related reasons. The United Nations International Organization for Migration states that the world will experience from 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050.¹ It notes that the most cited forecast of 200 million is almost equal to today's total number of international migrants, which is less than 4 percent of the world's population. However, the estimate that usually makes the headlines is that of 1 billion migrants, which is expected to be more than 10 percent of the world's population in 2050.

Experts have criticized the validity and scientific rigor of many of these forecasts. While scientific models constantly improve, scientists caution about the complexity of the environment—migration nexus. Migration models are based on assumptions about future demographic, socioeconomic, and development trends, migratory behaviors, and changes in the environment. Experts warn that models are not prophecies but politicians and the media often treat forecast migration numbers as oracular certainties. What is particularly conspicuous in today's deeply polarized political atmosphere is how these hyperbolic predictions feed into a growing consensus across the political aisle. The shared narrative depicts climate migration as the next apocalypse.

Such apprehension is not surprising for those who have been concerned about the devastating effects of climate change for a long time. Migration and displacement are perceived as intrinsic consequences of irreversible human-induced damage to Earth's ecosystem. Continuing down the path the world is on will exacerbate inequalities, force billions to move, and keep many more trapped in dangerous locations. But the embrace of this narrative by far-



Susan's Bay, a coastal settlement in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Photo: Achilles Kallergis

right populists, who have denied and continue to question the effects of climate change, is a startling shift. It is centered around the paradox of climate denialism coexisting with fears of future tsunamis of climate refugees. In this case, fear is not materialized through the cause but through the consequence. It becomes vivid in the prognostications about billions of others migrating in disorderly fashion from the Global South to seek refuge in Europe and elsewhere due to environmental hardship. There, these newcomers will clog welfare systems; dilute racial, cultural, and national traits; and, somewhat ironically, lead to the degradation of local natural resources. According to this view, stopping the tide of climate migrants demands impermeable borders as well as efforts to dissuade and contain movement. In the words of Jordan Bardella, spokesperson of France's far-right National Rally, "Borders are the environment's greatest ally... it is through them that we will save the planet."²

There is little value in arguing why Bardella is wrong. What Joe Turner and Dan Bailey label as "ecobordering"—the casting of immigration control as a form of environmental protection—will contribute little to saving the planet.³ After all, climate migrants and their poor sending countries bear little responsibility for the historical emissions of advanced economies that are the culprit in global warming. Reframing the narrative on environmental mobility requires us to emphasize why visions of large-scale migratory movements between regions contradict reality. At present, there is no indication of climate change leading to mass migration from Africa to Europe or generally from South to North regions. On the contrary, empirical evidence and rigorous future estimates point to climate variability resulting mostly in internal migration, with movements that are short in distance and duration, often from rural to urban areas.

These findings should not cause relief, however. A crisis is well underway but it is one manifested much more locally within the world's most vulnerable regions. Research I recently conducted in African cities, in collaboration with local slum communities of the Slum Dwellers International community network,⁴ points to high levels of climate vulnerability due to the precarious conditions in informal settlements, where half of urbanites live and rural migrants move into. People are thus moving toward environmental risk that is compounded by poverty, overcrowding, lack of services and housing insecurity, and the locational and topographic characteristics of settlements. For the affected communities, this leads to maladaptation, simultaneously trapping people in place and perpetuating a cycle of displacement. Climate migration takes place in parallel to the much larger transformation from rural to urban society in Africa. The number of forecast environmental migrants

is dwarfed by the future rural-to-urban migration and the natural population growth that will occur in African cities, which are expected to grow to be the world's largest urban agglomerations by the century's end.

It is therefore crucial that European policymakers reposition environmental mobility as an issue of grave concern but not as an immediate threat to Europe's borders. They can do so by paying more attention to the growing scientific evidence pointing to the localized migration effects of climate change. Beyond its own adaptation and mitigation strategies, Europe needs to support efforts to increase the resilience of vulnerable populations in Global South countries. Finally, it is crucial to acknowledge that anthropogenic climate change—a global bad that advanced economies are primarily responsible for creating and that low-income nations bear the brunt of—can be addressed solely through concerted collective efforts and cooperation.

Forty years ago, Jack Hirshleifer, used a fictitious circular island, *Anarchia*, to explain how in the absence of government, the level of protection from flooding for all islanders depended on the lowest dike that each family created to protect its individual property.⁵ This imagery is particularly appropriate in the context of a changing climate in an unequal world. Addressing the consequences of environmental change, inevitably including migration and displacement, requires those of us in the Global North to think not only about our actions but also about how the level of protection of vulnerable populations will determine the planet's collective well-being. <

1) International Organization for Migration. A Complex Nexus. Accessed on April 18, 2023, www.iom.int/complexnexus#:~:text=Future%20forecasts%20vary%20from%2025,estimate%20of%20international%20migrants%20worldwide

2) France 24, "Le Pen's National Rally goes green in bid for European election votes," April 20, 2019, www.france24.com/en/20190420-le-pen-national-rally-front-environment-european-elections-france

3) Joe Turner & Dan Bailey (2022) 'Ecobordering': casting immigration control as environmental protection, *Environmental Politics*, 31:1, 110–131.

4) climatemobilities.org

5) Jack Hirshleifer, "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods" *Public Choice*, 41, 1983, 371–386.

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Adios, National Social Welfare

BY PEGGY LEVITT

Today, states are not the sole providers of social welfare to their citizens. Families access social protections transnationally. Some individuals are extremely well protected while others are left more vulnerable than ever.



Photo: shansakala / iStockphoto.com

Erika is an educated twenty-seven-year-old Swedish woman who works as a project manager for a hi-tech firm in South Korea. Even though she lives far away from home, she does not worry about getting ill or about how she will support herself when she retires. That is because, in addition to the social welfare she is entitled to in Sweden, she also gets generous health insurance, pension contributions, and paid family leave as part of her job in South Korea.

Gimena's experience stands in stark contrast. She is a woman from Mexico, also twenty-seven, with a sixth-grade education. An undocumented migrant in the United States, she works off-the-books as a health aide at a senior citizens home, for which she receives no health or retirement benefits. She will not become eligible for the minimal health coverage the U.S. offers to undocumented workers until she has been in the country for at least five years. Instead, she relies on friends and family members when she gets sick or money runs short. Things will look brighter when Gimena returns to Mexico. She will be eligible for national health insurance and social security. She has also purchased a bit of insurance of her own by buying a home in her village, where her parents and children now live and where she plans to retire.

Both women protect and provide for themselves across borders. They piece together resources available in their sending and receiving countries to try to get the care and security they need. Erika has more

than enough while Gimena's efforts ensure only a threadbare and unreliable social safety net. One wrong turn, resulting in an accident or getting fired, would send Gimena and her family into desperate straits.

What their examples also make clear is that transformations in social welfare in one part of the world ripple across to others. Gimena works abroad as a care provider and her earnings support her family back home. This means that, while she supports her aging parents and children financially, she cannot take care of them herself. Other family members or hired help must step in. In some countries, the care deficit created when large numbers of traditional caregivers migrate prompts the state to act. So many of Poland's citizens work as caregivers abroad that its government made a deal with that of the Philippines to bring large numbers of Filipinos to care for Polish senior citizens.

The New Context of Social Protection

These stories speak to a dramatic shift in how and where social welfare is provided in our world on the move. Readers living in the European Union, where transnational social protection programs are among the most highly developed, will be aware of this change. They have a European Health Insurance Card, which means that their treatment will be covered if they get sick in a different member state. They can also bring their pension when they move from job to job across the EU,

though this is difficult to put into practice. My colleagues and I heard horror stories about the bureaucratic hurdles it takes to draw on a pension earned in one EU country while living in another.

More and more people live for extended periods outside their country of citizenship without full rights or voice where they reside. An increasing number also live outside their country of citizenship but still participate in some way in its political and economic life. These individuals span the socioeconomic spectrum from poor migrants, like Gimena, who are forced to move because they cannot support their families back home to highly educated professionals, like Erika, who can easily take advantage of opportunities anywhere. Either way, nationally bounded social welfare systems, based on the idea of people living in one place and receiving what they need from one state of which they are citizens, are increasingly out of date.

Instead, an increasing number of people protect themselves and their families transnationally. They harness formal and informal resources across borders to create resource environments that combine support from the state, the market, civil society (including nongovernmental organizations, labor unions, and religious organizations), and their social networks. While some of these forms of support are contractual and therefore reliable, depending upon care from friends or community organizations is unpredictable at best. It is also place-dependent.

If a person like Gimena lives in Los Angeles, there will be many immigrant aid organizations around and a strong Latino community she can turn to for help. If she lives in rural Wyoming, she is much more likely to be on her own.

In this context, the social contract between citizen and state is shifting in three important ways.

First, states are shedding some functions and taking on others. They are downsizing as health care and pensions are privatized (think of the disturbing stories we hear about the once-lauded National Health Service in the United Kingdom) but also supersizing by taking on new functions with respect to their citizens living abroad.

Second, citizenship and social rights are increasingly decoupled. In the past, only national citizenship guaranteed access to basic levels of health care and education. Now, as many countries step back from providing social welfare for their citizens, they also offer some protections to non-citizens. Argentina, for example, offers universal access to its public health system to all residents, regardless of citizenship, after six months in the country.

Third, there is a denationalizing of social rights. States do not just protect their citizens living within their territory; they also extend care to those living abroad. Mexico, for example, issues its citizens in the United States a *matricula consular*, an identity card that helps them get drivers licenses and open bank accounts there without a U.S. social security number. It also offers financial

literacy courses and primary health care at its consular offices around the United States on the basis that a well-educated, healthy, and solvent migrant is good for both countries.

The Way Forward

What happened during the global coronavirus pandemic provides clear evidence that nationally based social welfare is out of sync with how people earn their livelihoods and care for their families. Because disease knows no borders, health care should not either. Because jobs cross borders, so must pensions. Even in moments of heightened xenophobia and nationalism, the social welfare of citizens everywhere is deeply interconnected.

As more people face precarious employment, greater economic inequality, and ecological pressures wrought by climate change that force them to move, understanding how families actually protect and provide for themselves is more urgent than ever. How they do so clearly challenges the conventional idea of a static relationship between social protection and place, space, or citizenship.

New ways of formulating policies and implementing them are also urgently needed. Regional institutions, like the European Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Countries, are a way forward but these vary considerably with respect to the money and resources they have to put into transnational social protection projects. Policymaking on cross-border issues is still seen as something done between two or more sovereign states. Until we break out of that nation-state box and find new ways to cooperate and share resources, the Gimenas of the world will remain vulnerable, lacking basic rights and care.

Crucially, transnational social protection is by no means a panacea. It reshuffles rather than eliminates inequality. Enhanced protection for some results in greater vulnerability for others. What is more, the work done by people like Gimena allow people like Erika to live the protected life they lead. We need to recognize this new reality, bring the way people actually live and the systems meant to protect them back in sync with one another, and to figure out who the new winners and losers are. ◀

The present essay draws on the recently published book *Transnational Social Protection*, authored by Peggy Levitt, Erica Dobbs, Ken Sun, and Ruxandra Paul (see section Publications, p. 23)

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The Coloniality of Power in Techno-borderscapes

BY GIORGIA DONÀ

Unpacking colonialism and its living legacy is key to understanding the new relationship between migration, borders, and technological innovations. Several interconnected processes are at play: data colonialism, neocolonial alliances, exploitation of migrants' suffering, and techno-colonial values. These dialogical practices make visible how the coloniality of power operates in techno-borderscapes.

Digital technologies are increasingly used by different social actors for different purposes, including migration management and border governance, humanitarian assistance, and resistance and solidarity. Along “smart borders,” drones are used to monitor crossings while, after crossing, people on the move are required to provide their fingerprints, which are stored in databases accessible across national borders. Refugees living in camps are subjected to iris recognition as a prerequisite for accessing humanitarian aid while international organizations collect and store the biometric information of those seeking protection. Activists engage in counter-border strategies and promote transnational migrant solidarity through digital platforms. Marie Godin and I introduced the term “techno-borderscapes” to describe these digitally mediated encounters, contestations, and disruptions among migrant and non-migrant subjectivities at borders. Techno-borderscapes are not neutral spaces but sites of contestation, struggles, and negotiations.

The proliferation of digital technologies for migration management, border governance, and humanitarian assistance is innovative and future-oriented. Yet, this hides continuities with the past that reproduce colonial relations. Anibal Quijano uses the term “coloniality of power” to capture the living legacy of colonialism in forms of social discrimination, exclusion, and exploitation that outlived formal colonialism and became integrated in succeeding social orders. Unpacking colonialism and its living legacy is key to understanding the relationship between migration, borders, and technological innovations. An examination of interconnected processes reveals how the coloniality of power operates in techno-borderscapes.

Data Colonialism: Biometric Categorizations and Hierarchical Social Orders

The use of biometrics—computer-based identification systems of persons by physiological characteristics—is one of the central tools used for migration management, governance, and humanitarianism. Systems such as the United Kingdom's Biometric Residence Permit, Entry/Exit System, and Automated Fingerprint Identification cross the border



Photo: Iremenko / iStockphoto.com

from the “bio”—migrants’ lives—to the “metrics”—the inorganic signifier. The genealogy of biometrics can be traced to the colonial project when fingerprinting was first tested on British subjects in India. The systematic counting of bodies under colonial rule in India, Africa, and Southeast Asia is reinscribed in the arrangement of biometric information collected from racialized and gendered subjects, many fleeing from countries with colonial histories. The production of biometric categories and the formation of social hierarchies through information flows speaks of data colonialism.

Like the colonial project of counting, categorizing, creating hierarchies, and normalizing difference between colonized and colonizers, data colonialism generates biometric data to order and segregate racialized and gendered subjects across time and spaces. The binary of colonizer and colonized is reproduced through that of citizen and non-citizen or of legal and illegal migrant. Difference becomes normalized through “risk and racial profiling” that separates deserving and undeserving migrants. Under the justification of administrative expediency and the uncritical assumption of algorithmic neutrality, biometrics are anthropomorphized to be arbiters of who has the right to cross borders, which rights a person is entitled to,

and what resources an individual is allowed to access.

Neocolonial Engagements: States, Humanitarians, and Tech Companies

The coloniality of power operates in techno-borderscapes through neocolonial engagements and allegiances. During colonial times, a range of actors worked together to govern, exploit, and control the colonized. In addition to colonial administrators and political representatives, other actors ranging from traders (for example, the East India Company) to missionaries contributed to maintaining asymmetrical power relations. Today, similarly, conventional actors like states and humanitarian agencies forge new partnerships with tech companies, defense-industry providers, and private businesses. The resulting shifting alliances and loyalties reproduce neocolonial engagements.

The work of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen offers an example of the ways in which the coloniality of power operates through new neocolonial engagements. The organization has been criticized for striking a partnership with Palantir, a software private company with a dubious human rights track record. In June 2019, the WFP issued an ultimatum to the Houthi movement in

Yemen to participate in its biometric identification system or receive less aid. Resisting this neocolonial project, the Houthis chose a partial stoppage of aid, accusing the WFP of being a surveillance operation and critiquing its “data” governance.

Data-Exploitation, Extraction, and Accumulation

Whereas minerals and spices were precious goods during colonial times, data is the new treasured commodity. Data mining has replaced mineral mining. Data is the new gold that is extracted and accumulated, sold for profit, or exchanged for gain. Often under some form of coercion, refugees in camps and migrants crossing borders are required to have their fingerprints taken or iris identified. Tech companies are tasked by states and humanitarian actors to collect and store this valuable resource. The lives of migrants and refugees are transformed into a commodity. Data colonialism occurs where value is extracted from this data for the benefit of various stakeholders.

Biometrics can be commodified and shared in ways that go against the interests of the givers. In the United Kingdom, for instance, personal data collected by the National Health Service from migrants accessing healthcare can be disclosed

to the Home Office and can result in deportations or detention of non-citizens. Data colonialism operates under the guise of giving while taking away. Biometric information has become part and parcel of the neoliberal project where people's misery subsidizes the accumulation of capital.

Modernity and Techno-colonialism

Digital technologies are usually celebrated by states for efficient border surveillance, by humanitarian agencies under the rubric of “tech for good,” and by activists for their mobilizing force. Despite criticism of their fallibilities or of risks in techno-borderscapes, they are here to stay. Their often uncritical celebration does not emerge from nor exists in a vacuum. It is embedded in Western modernity, with its appreciation of science, individualism, and innovations.

In the past, colonial narratives of progress privileged the power of the colonizers at the expense of the colonized. The fascination with progress obscured the dark side of modernity—the suffering and exploitation of colonial subjects and the price paid for the benefit of the colonizers. Similarly, techno-colonialism is a value system entrenched in Western modernity that in the name of progress uncritically justifies the conversion of bio into metrics. This leaves unquestioned the novel centrality of the for-profit tech sector in traditional not-for-profit spheres and fails to challenge the data mining and exploitation of the suffering of migrants and refugees. It shies away from its dark side.

Thus, to unpack the ways in which the coloniality of power operates in techno-borderscapes is key to achieving a more balanced imaginary of the relationship between migration, borders, and technological innovations. <

This essay is an extract from the keynote “Migration Management, Borders and Digital Technologies: The Coloniality of Power in Techno-borderscapes,” presented at the conference Digitized Migrants that the IWM/CRG Europe-Asia Research Platform on Forced Migration organized in Turkey in September 2022.

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Reorganization of Borders and (Im)Mobility: Labor and the Coloniality of Power

BY AYŞE ÇAĞLAR

Restrictions on mobility during the Covid-19 pandemic did not conjugate with citizenship. They blurred the “secured openness” of the EU’s internal borders (for the EU citizens) and the closures against its “outside.” Labor is the key to understanding this otherwise puzzling landscape of (im)mobility. It is an important reminder of the coloniality that lies at the heart of bordering regimes and citizenship.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, more than 90 percent of countries introduced measures to restrict cross-border and internal mobility. No matter what kind of regional or supranational border regulation jurisdictions were in place, nation states determined who would be exempt from the inbound and internal travel bans across their territories and on what basis. Contrary to the key criterion in regulating people’s movement across and within national borders, citizenship status was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for people to be subject to or exempt from cross-border and internal travel bans during the pandemic. Mobility restrictions did not conjugate with citizenship. Though this form of mobility governance might appear paradoxical, it reflects the inherent contradictions of citizenship and highlights the colonial lineages of today’s nation states and their citizenship regimes. The reorganization of borders and mobility in the wake of Covid-19 urges us to reconsider the centrality of a particular pattern of power, namely the coloniality of power, in the constitution and governance of people, and above all of labor, in connection to accruing capital. Labor is the key to understanding the otherwise puzzling landscape of (im)mobility that came about during Covid-19.

In the European Union, those working in sectors designated as essential for society and economy, including seasonal workers, were allowed to bypass the pandemic cross-border and internal mobility restrictions. Most importantly, this category was comprised of citizens: not only EU workers but also “third country nationals” (TCNs), refugees, and undocumented people. Thus, the exemptions from cross-border and internal mobility bans produced a legal persona for an otherwise heterogeneous group of workers with differential legal status. However, this exceptional right to mobility granted to some workers was not coupled with any social and economic rights. On the contrary, no matter whether they were EU citizens (such as workers from Bulgaria and Romania in Germany) or TCNs (such as workers in agriculture or care sectors from Ukraine, North Africa, and the Mid-



A migrant at work in the countryside of Calabria in Southern Italy (April 30, 2020). Italian agriculture faces many difficulties because there are no workers to harvest fruits and vegetables.

dle East in Italy), they were deprived of their social and economic rights in their mobility. These flexibilized workers, independent of their citizenship status, slipped through the cracks of state care. The simultaneity of exceptional mobility rights and of deprivation of social and economic rights highlights not only the differential inclusion mechanisms that citizenship always entails, but also how the vulnerabilized social lives of such essential workers are maintained and reproduced.

The mobility granted to essential, temporary, and seasonal workers is an organized and regulated one that simultaneously depletes but also strives on these workers’ social bonds. Often the workers are brought to their cross-border or internal destination through particular transport arrangements and live in pre-arranged, secluded lodgings in their workplaces. Such arrangements function against the essential workers establishing social bonds with the others in their place of arrival. At the same time, the reproduction of this labor is built upon the social bonds and care arrangements among the essential workers in their new work places as well as back home. Deprived of social, medical, and economic rights, they need to rely on each other to maintain their bodies, health, and daily lives in their places of arrival. The re-

sponsibility for the social reproduction of labor as a whole rests preeminently on the workers themselves. In fact, without care arrangements elsewhere (like child care), it is almost impossible for them to sustain their livelihood as workers. Thus, this complex landscape of (im)mobility with its variegated social and economic rights regimes reveals not only the dilemmas of labor and capital accumulation, but also their social reproduction.

The mobile workers during the pandemic had an ambiguous position. At one point they were valorized as for helping avert the breakdown of supply chains; for undertaking the essential work of health care, domestic care, and agricultural work; and for remitting much-needed currency to their places of origin. Reduced to their identity and presence as labor, these migrants were even welcomed by anti-migrant, right-wing governments because they ensured the continued functioning of certain essential sectors. On the other hand, the mobile bodies of migrant labor was demonized outside of their quality as labor as they were simultaneously seen as mobile virus-spreading bodies in their places of work and back home.

This assemblage of rights and value certainly laid bare the tensions and lineages of citizenship and the governance of borders that

could and should be related to the colonial forms of power producing governable subjects and regulating mobility closely connected to labor and processes of accumulation. Here, it is important to recall that it was in the colonial age that the governing principles of mobility, mobile bodies, labor, and population were first laid down. Colonial rule needed flexible border policies to manage, stabilize, and govern population groups. The bordering regimes and graduated forms of sovereignty at frontiers were important to ensure the flexible management of variably dispossessed and devalued labor. The simultaneous restrictiveness and selective openness of today’s borders are embedded in the historical genealogies of empire states and nation states.

The (im)mobility registers of the pandemic exposed the coloniality inherent in the border regimes of today’s nation states. By dividing and classifying people with different rights, this form of regulation was crucial to ensure the differentiated labor mobility required to accrue capital in the past and today. The landscape of Covid-19 closures revealed the actual coloniality of today’s bordering policies. In the EU, by blurring of the supposedly secured openness of borders for the privileged member-state citizens and the closures against its “outside,” the

exceptions to the bans highlight the coloniality at the heart of bordering regimes and citizenship.

Coloniality and Racial Capitalism

The coloniality of power as a concept underlines the constitutive role played by racial hierarchies for capitalism. Most importantly, it underlines that coloniality differs from colonialism in that the former does not vanish with decolonization or independence; instead, coloniality is structurally inherent to capitalism.¹ In this perspective, the hierarchized social differences and the division of people and labor are pivotal to capitalism, and racism enshrines the required inequalities. The production, appropriation, and reproduction of differences are crucial to the constitution of subject people, capital, capitalism, and social reproduction. This urges us to analyze the processes of accumulation, the social and cultural construction of hierarchies of difference, and their “social separatedness”² as well as their centrality in maintaining social lives in relationship to each other.

The pandemic and its (im)mobility landscapes made the coloniality of power at the heart of tensions about citizenship visible once more. This is not an argument to reduce all forms of power to colonial rule, but rather a call to recognize the centrality of the coloniality of power in understanding the logics of (im)mobility and labor governance in connection to accumulation processes. Ironically, the Covid-19 virus, which recognized no borders and respected no conventions, protection regimes, or regulation policies—in other words, a “virus without borders”—laid bare the workings of borders and human mobility governance in our world and the inherent tensions of citizenship. <

An expanded version of this article appeared in *Citizenship Studies* 2022, 4–5: *Citizenship Struggles: 25th Anniversary Special Issue*.

- 1) Quijano, A. “Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America,” *International Sociology* 15 (2), 2000.
- 2) Melamed, J. 2015. “Racial Capitalism,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1 (1): 76.

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A Hospitable Europe?

BY LUIZA BIALASIEWICZ

The EU's response to the mass arrival of Ukrainians displaced by the war has been characterized as exceptional, mobilizing legal and financial measures absent in previous migration "crises." We need to question, however, who actually provided this much lauded hospitality and where, and also the very discourse of hospitality that has dominated the reception of Ukrainian refugees.



Julia Krahn has invited female Ukrainian refugees to tell their stories through images and interviews. "I do not want to give an account of the war, explore why it was started or who keeps it going and for what reasons. Instead, I want to tell the story of the people suffering under it. Beyond the propaganda, there are real human beings." www.stjavelin.art

over half a million of the over 2.5 million refugees had either passed through or remained in the city. Writing in *The Economist* in April 2022, Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski described how "the city mobilized in extraordinary fashion." The situation was paralleled in other large Polish cities such as Kraków and Wrocław. But, as Trzaskowski made clear, the response was almost entirely "a bottom-up process driven mostly by a dense network of co-operation between volunteers, charities and local governments."

Elizabeth Cullen-Dunn and Iwona Kaliszewska have described the Polish response as a form of "distributed humanitarianism" that permitted a much faster and scalable response than aid agencies or the national state could deliver.¹ They write that "volunteer aid chains could organize themselves and move goods much more quickly than the institutionalized aid agencies, with their formalized needs assessments, procurement procedures, and needs for accountability. This allowed them to meet changing needs more quickly. But even more importantly, the volunteer aid chains were scalable: when 8.5 million refugees were crossing the Polish border, millions of volunteer aid chains were formed, but as the number of refugees dwindled, the number of aid chains dropped."

Poland was not unique in this; in countries such as Austria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, most of the aid that Ukrainians were able to access in the first months of the war came from municipal governments and informal volunteer efforts rather than international or state agencies.

In many ways, such re-scaling of responsibility to urban actors

for the reception of refugees was already evident in the 2015 "hospitality crisis" as EU member states revealed themselves unable or simply unwilling to provide adequate reception for those requiring protection. Whether as part of more formal city-to-city networks (such as Solidarity Cities or the Pact of Free Cities), of networked solidarity initiatives (such as the Refugees Welcome network), or of more activist forms of migrant self-organization (such as the Hotel Plaza initiative in Athens), the reception of refugees had increasingly become devolved to the local level before 2022.

Homes and Hosts

What is new about the EU response to Ukrainian refugees, however, is the further scaling down of the responsibility for refugee reception not just to urban authorities and organizations but to private citizens—and the institutionalization of such forms of private reception. Across the EU, the great majority of Ukrainian refugees have been hosted in private homes (and often by Ukrainian communities already present in cities such as Warsaw).

In the United Kingdom, the 'Homes for Ukraine' scheme that matches Ukrainian nationals with local hosts has provided accommodation for over 75,000. In France, the Ministry of the Interior launched the 'Pour l'Ukraine' platform to coordinate the efforts of local municipalities and private citizens to provide housing. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice and Security turned directly to Dutch NGOs to create the 'RefugeeHomeNL' platform, relying on the support of the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Netherlands Council for Refugees, and a new organization called 'Takecarebnb.'

While such schemes may have allowed for a rapid response at the start of the war, they are encountering a variety of challenges as time goes on. A study published in February 2023 by the Warsaw-based Centre of Migration Research (CMR) noted that over half of Ukrainian refugees in Poland did not have stable accommodation (less than 10 percent were housed in formal refugee centers). A similar study by the NGO Ukrainian Action in Ireland in March 2023 noted that housing precarity was the biggest challenge for refugees.

In the United Kingdom, a quarter of the hosts for the Homes for Ukraine scheme did not want to continue the arrangement beyond six months. This had less to do with

changing attitudes and more with their feeling of being completely abandoned by the state. One host told the BBC: "What the government are asking from you is to provide a full social security system. As soon as there's any problem or confusion or challenge, there was nowhere to turn." Studies by the CMR in Poland reveal a similar dynamic: while the willingness of Poles to provide private assistance did not undergo a significant change over the past year, what did change was their trust in the state's ability to "provide systemic solutions."

The Precarity of Hospitality

While we should recognize the response of countless Europeans in "giving home" to Ukrainians fleeing the war, we also need to pay heed to the perils of privatized hospitality. First, such hospitality is always precarious, relying on the charity of hosts rather than on legally guaranteed rights to protection. Second, it is inevitably unequal, with hosts deciding who they are willing to be hospitable to and for how long. Scholars have written extensively about the hierarchies of vulnerability that "sort" refugees' right to protection.² As protection is further re-scaled to private homes, such hierarchies of vulnerability are also entangled with hierarchies of "hostability," with hosts deciding not just whom to make safe but also who is safe for them. Finally, since hospitality is necessarily an unequal relation, guests are not seen as legitimate holders of rights but burdened with expectations of recognition and gratitude (as reports of abuse and exploitation of the mostly female Ukrainian guests have highlighted).

As David Featherstone has argued, transversal solidarities extended by private citizens are always "without guarantees."³ In the EU, such guarantees must be provided by the member states, which cannot continue to rely upon the charity of private actors to ensure the full range of legally binding rights to those displaced by the Ukraine war. <

1) Cullen-Dunn, Elizabeth, Iwona Kaliszewska (2022). Distributed humanitarianism. Volunteerism and aid to refugees during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, *American Ethnologist* 50 (1), 2023, 19–29.

2) Pallister-Wilkins, Polly (2022) *Humanitarian Borders: Unequal Mobility and Saving Lives*. New York: Verso.

3) Featherstone, David (2012). *Solidarity: Hidden histories and geographies of internationalism*. London: Zed Books.

The European Union's activation of its Temporary Protection Directive just weeks after the start of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was widely lauded as showing an exceptional response. The directive, which had never been activated in previous migration "crises" (including the 2015 "summer of migration"), provided Ukrainian refugees with the right to temporary residence as well as to housing, schooling, medical care, social welfare, and access to the labor market. Equally importantly, it allowed them movement between member states as well as pendular movement with Ukraine. EU institutions and member states also mobilized new funding mechanisms with great speed, including Cohesion Policy funds (meant for post-pandemic recovery, now re-allocated to fund refugee housing, education, and healthcare) and the Home Affairs Fund, drawing money from member states and private

donors to create adequate reception facilities.

While such measures were unprecedented, they tell only a small part of the story. The Temporary Protection Directive has been applied in highly unequal fashion across member states (and even within them), with access to the right to healthcare or welfare payments entailing very different things in different countries. What is more, beyond the celebratory pronouncements of an exceptional and coordinated response, the actual reception of the displaced relied for the most part not on state authorities (and even less so on EU or international institutions) but rather on networks of volunteers and private citizens.

The Actual Geographies of Reception

Poland is a case in point. In the first month of the war, the population of Warsaw increased by 17 percent as

“Arrival” Infrastructures: Ukrainian Displaced People in Vienna

BY VOLHA BIZIUKOVA, RUSLANA KOZIENKO, AND ANNA LAZAREVA

A research project launched by the IWM within its Europe-Asia Research Platform on Forced Migration and directed by Professor Ayşe Çağlar has explored the reception of the displaced people from Ukraine in Vienna.

In March 2022, Vienna, like other European cities, became a major arrival and transition hub for people fleeing the war in Ukraine. These cities had to find ways to manage and attend to the needs of those newly arrived in what would soon become the largest wave of displacement in Europe since the Second World War. The reception of these people in Vienna was shaped by the interplay of national and international legal frameworks as well as by historical legacies of managing forced and labor migration in Austria.

Not Refugees: Temporary Protection in Austria

Although the Ukrainian displaced are usually referred to as refugees, their status under the European Union's Temporary Protection Directive is different in terms of legal status and rights. Designed in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars to deal with mass influxes of people and introduced in 2001, the directive was activated for the first time in March 2022. While listing basic guarantees and rights, it does not specify the level of support or the mechanisms of implementation. As a result, EU countries had to decide how to put the directive into practice in their national legal contexts as well as how to provide the displaced with access to the labor market, basic social services, accommodation, and other spheres within its frame.

Austria's decision to include the displaced from Ukraine in its system of Basic Care (*Grundversorgung*) became extremely consequential as this equated their support with that of asylum seekers, for whom this system was originally developed in the early 2000s. The *Grundversorgung* is generally characterized by a relatively low level of assistance: up to €260 per month in cash allowance for an adult plus up to €330 per month of accommodation allowance per family or else a place in an organized residence facility. In the latter case, the monthly cash payment is reduced to a minimum of €40 when people are also fed in such facilities. This relatively low level of assistance, as was suggested by some of our interviewees from involved NGOs, was meant to disincentivize potential asylum applications in Austria.

Over the past year, the Ukrainian displaced were subjected to the earning threshold established for asylum seekers within the *Grund-*



Kateryna Lysovenko, *Safe place.*
The work is dedicated to everyone who is not at home but in a safe place.

versorgung, which restricted their access to the labor market. Earning more than €110 (and an additional €80 per dependent) meant losing one's entitlement to all support. This scheme not only left the displaced with inadequate means to support themselves but also worked against their incorporation into the official labor market and pushed some into informal employment. Currently, legislative changes are being introduced that would lead to a gradual reduction of *Grundversorgung* support in line with the size of earnings.

At the same time, unlike asylum seekers, the beneficiaries of temporary protection do not have potential transition paths to other statuses of international protection or legal residence in Austria that would come with rights to which different statuses entitle (for example, access to the general social security system or a path to citizenship). Thus, arguably, in the way the system functions now, people under temporary protection in some respects end up in a disadvantageous position compared to recognized refugees and people under subsidiary protection.

The Ordinary “Extraordinariness” of Mass Influxes

There is a pattern of approaching mass influxes of people in Europe as

extraordinary and unexpected. This is manifested not only in the underdeveloped legal framework of temporary protection but also in the organizational strategies of responding to the influxes and treating them as singular precedents. In interviews, representatives of civil society and major NGOs often underlined the unpreparedness of the Austrian authorities for the mass influx of people even as the war in Ukraine was looming. They drew attention to how little was learned from the influx in 2015 and to the unwillingness to harness the continuity of institutional solutions. Many of the institutional structures established back then were soon dismantled as “unnecessary,” and thus organizational solutions yet again had to be developed from scratch in 2022.

Overreliance on Civil Society: Successes and Bottlenecks

Civil society largely shouldered the reception of people in Austria, especially during the first weeks of the influx. Due to the visa-free regime and the opened borders, those fleeing the war in Ukraine arrived directly in Vienna, which put a disproportionate burden on the City of Vienna, contrary to the legislatively established scheme in which the representatives of the federal state are expect-

ed to meet asylum seekers at the border. The city authorities relied largely on civil society finding resources and meeting the immediate needs of the displaced.

The civil society involved in the reception of the displaced formed a heterogeneous landscape of actors. Among them were major NGOs that acted on behalf of the Vienna authorities within the established system of outsourcing the management of asylum seekers to such actors. There were also volunteering grassroots initiatives and independent volunteers who provided systematic assistance and were more proactive, responding faster to the unfolding situation. Ordinary people who donated humanitarian aid and money or who offered private accommodation also

played an outstanding role.

The heavy reliance on civil society to house and meet the needs of those arriving from Ukraine extended well beyond the first weeks of the war as the state proved reluctant to establish more systematic support schemes for them. The shortcomings of this arrangement became particularly salient as the volume of resources available through donations dwindled over time. This situation made apparent that overreliance on civil society is unsustainable and that systematic state support is needed. One of the consequent bottlenecks was the basic failure of the second line of reception—providing for people's needs in the long term.

Overall, the response to the influx of the displaced from Ukraine developed into a patchwork of ad hoc tactics to address immediate problems, often with a relatively short horizon of planning. At the same time, these tactics were shaped by preexisting path-binding structures and modus operandi of major actors.

Navigating Life in Vienna: A Patchwork of Coping Strategies

Finding themselves in a situation shaped by the factors described above, displaced people had to develop a patchwork of coping strategies to sustain themselves in Vienna

in the long term. Due to the insufficient level of assistance to cover basic needs, they had to secure additional sources of support. This includes using up their savings and seeking diverse forms of earning in Austria or from elsewhere, remittances from relatives or friends, benefiting from accommodation provided for free or at a lower than the market price and relying on various forms of humanitarian aid.

Despite the promise of temporary protection status and personal willingness, the majority were unable to find a job due to common European (language, recognition of diplomas and experience) but also specifically Austrian barriers (income threshold and the recently lifted AMS permit). This drove people to the informal labor market. Moreover, as the majority of those who fled were females, they often carried the double burden of securing resources for the subsistence and care of dependent children and elderly too.

Overall, despite the efforts and the engagement of various state and non-state actors, the strain and contradictions of this system had to be borne by the displaced from Ukraine. Their situation has been characterized by many struggles, shortages, and vulnerabilities. Many were driven to leave Austria for the unsafety of Ukraine. Notwithstanding this, our interviewees from Ukraine refused to succumb to despair and helplessness.

Rather than representing an exception, the situation of the Ukrainian displaced in Austria exposed the existing tensions and deficiencies of the established system of governing displaced people in Austria. The implementation of temporary protection in the case of the displaced from Ukraine has been in many ways shaped by the general erosion of international protection. In this situation, the temporariness of their status has been the breeding ground for temporariness of stay and possibly for enduring vulnerability. ◀

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Ukrainian Identity in Time of War: More Salient and Radical

BY VOLODYMYR KULYK

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had a significant impact on Ukrainian identity. While the most vivid shift is the strengthening of civic attachment of members of different ethnic, linguistic and regional groups, the invasion has also radicalized ethnocultural components of Ukrainian identity.

On the eve of Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine, most politicians and analysts in the West believed that if President Vladimir Putin decided to invade, Ukraine would be unable to withstand this as its army was weak, its society was divided, and many citizens would welcome the Russian troops. Therefore, they were much surprised when the Ukrainian army pushed the invaders far from Kyiv, millions of citizens went to the frontline or actively supported those there, and in the occupied cities many more people protested the occupation than welcomed it.

One important source of Ukraine's resilience is a strong national identity—the overarching attachment to one's homeland above ethnic, linguistic, or regional ties. This was long overlooked by most analysts who emphasized ethnolinguistic or regional divisions and thus believed that a Ukrainian civic nation had not yet developed. They painted the picture of a country divided between the Ukrainian-speaking west and the Russian-speaking east, while failing to notice the large-scale reidentification of ethnic Russians as Ukrainians and the embrace by many Russian-speakers of Ukrainian as their national language.

In fact, Ukrainian national identity was strong already before the full-blown invasion, and it became an important source of Ukrainian society's remarkable resilience in the confrontation with a mighty aggressor. At the same time, the invasion enhanced the salience of national identity and changed its meaning for many people calling themselves Ukrainians. While the most vivid change is the strengthening of civic attachment, the invasion has also radicalized the ethnocultural content of national identity; that is, attitudes that were traditionally associated with Ukrainian ethnic identity but now are being embraced by many people of other ethnic origins.

The most important component of national identity in terms of its contribution to societal resilience is a strong civic attachment of members of different ethnic, linguistic, and regional groups. Survey results demonstrate that most people prioritize their identity as citizens of Ukraine—or as Ukrainians, which now is seen as meaning the same—over their ethnic, linguistic, regional,



A view of a destroyed residential building with a Ukrainian flag in the background on May 3, 2022, in Borodyanka, Ukraine.

and other attachments. The growth of civic identity was particularly noticeable after the Euromaidan, which gave many Ukrainian citizens a strong confidence in their power to change the situation in the country, even if that meant rising against the government. The popular response to the full-scale invasion clearly manifested the strength of civic attachment and, at the same time, further enhanced it. While hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens volunteered to join the army or territorial defense units, millions contributed to the resistance by digging trenches, weaving camouflage netting, and—the most widespread of all kinds of help—donating money to buy military equipment, vehicles, medical, and other supplies for military units. Apart from helping the military, very many people helped civilians who found themselves close to the frontline or who had fled the areas of fighting to other parts of Ukraine or abroad.

This impressive national solidarity contributed to the growth of national identity and national pride, which were also boosted by the military prowess of the Ukrainian army. Actually, most Ukrainians declared from the very first days of the invasion that their country would prevail in the war, even if then this was more a demonstration of solidarity

than a confident expectation of victory. Victory became realistic only in April 2022 when the invaders were pushed out of the north of Ukraine, and even more so in the fall when the Ukrainian army reconquered large territories in the east and the south, not least due to considerable military help from the West. As often happens in a time of war, most Ukrainians have expressed strong support for their leadership and the conviction that things are moving in the right direction. Most remarkably, they are also strongly convinced that their country needs democracy rather than authoritarian rule.

While Ukrainian national identity is inclusive in that it is open to all citizens regardless of ethnic origin, language practice, or religious denomination, it is not strictly civic but also includes prominent ethnocultural elements. The most obvious change in the ethnocultural content of Ukrainian identity brought about by the full-scale war is the increased alienation from and hostility toward Russia, which most Ukrainians view as the aggressor. Survey data demonstrate a radical change in Ukrainians' perceptions of the Russian state and the Russian people. In 2014, after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the start of the conflict in Donbas, the change was largely limited to the Russian state. While the ma-

majority of respondents described Russia's policy toward Ukraine as "clearly unfriendly," they still said Ukrainians and Russians were "friendly" or even "brotherly" peoples. This changed in 2022 when outrage at the Russian state's brutal aggression against Ukraine was extended in public opinion to the Russian people, whom most Ukrainians view as supporting and enabling it. Already in March 2022, less than a month after the full-blown invasion, 98 percent of respondents said they considered Russia a hostile country, 56 percent that its goal was the "complete extermination of the Ukrainian people," and 66 percent that ordinary Russians were "fully to blame" or "rather to blame" for the aggression.

Another ethnocultural aspect of national identity pertains to views of the past. A nation's war with an external aggressor tends to boost among its members the perception of the past as characterized by being oppressed by and fighting against the current aggressor. In the case of Ukraine, this is vividly reflected in a more positive attitude toward the nationalist fighters of the first half of the twentieth century: the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its guerilla arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). While long demonized by Soviet and Russian propaganda as Nazi collab-

orators, now they are predominantly embraced as fighters for national independence against Russian imperialism. Not surprisingly, the share of respondents reporting a positive or rather positive attitude toward the UPA jumped from 32 percent in 2017 to 69 percent in 2022.

Finally, Russia's aggression has boosted citizens' attachment to the national language and their support for its prevalence in society. Since the early years of independence, Ukrainian politics has been a site of contestation between two visions of the titular language's role in society, one of which wanting to make it the main language of all social domains and the other preferring to keep Ukraine a bilingual country with Ukrainian having only a symbolic primacy. As Ukrainians increasingly consider the titular language an important element of national identity, the threat to the nation posed by a military intervention by the former imperial power leads them to more strongly embrace that language

in their own practice and to support its spread in society. Ever more people who used to speak only or mostly Russian started using Ukrainian more or even switched to it exclusively. In a 2022 survey, 80 percent of respondents chose the predominance of Ukrainian in all domains as the desirable language situation in the future, a significant change from 60 percent five years earlier, while only 15 percent said that Ukraine should be a bilingual country.

It thus looks like inclusive membership in the Ukrainian nation now coexists with rather radical ethnocultural attitudes that members are expected to share. While most Ukrainian citizens of different ethnic origin seem to have no problem embracing these attitudes, these may turn out to be problematic for some people in view of their family history, cultural practices, or other reasons. The de facto exclusion of such people from the new national identity is the price Ukraine is paying for national mobilization in the time of war, and it is a problem it will have to deal with after its eventual victory. ◀

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What Is Next for Crimea: De-Occupation & Decolonization

BY MARIIA SHYNKARENKO

With the prospect of Crimea's de-occupation growing, we should ask what happens after that. In dealing with the many challenges in restoring its territorial sovereignty, Ukraine should not forget about the indigenous Crimean Tatars. Prioritizing their right to self-determination might be a way to ensure long-lasting stability in the region.

Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyi likes repeating the phrase coined by Mustafa Dzhemilev, the leader of the Crimean Tatars: "It all began in Crimea, and it will end in Crimea." The peninsula was the first victim of Russia's aggression in 2014, a precursor to the Donbas war and to the full-scale invasion started in February 2022. For eight years, the brutal Russian annexation was seen as a *fait accompli* by most actors, including Ukraine's governments, which avoided bringing up the question of de-occupation. This has radically changed over the past year, as neither the government nor the Ukrainian people are ready to sacrifice their territories anymore.

Yet, as Tamila Tasheva, the permanent representative of the president of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, has noted, de-occupation is only the first step in the restoration of Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and many more challenges lie ahead. In contrast to the recently de-occupied territories of Kharkiv and Kherson, Crimea has been under occupation for almost a decade and thus requires a comprehensive strategy of reintegration.

There will be many ethical dilemmas facing the government: What to do with the hundreds of thousands of Russians who settled in Crimea after the annexation? How to treat collaborators and those who worked for the occupying state? How to demilitarize and de-Russify the region without resorting to the same methods as the occupier? How to return stolen property and businesses?

The de-occupation of Crimea and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity is viewed largely as a step in the country's overall process of decolonization. Yet in this thorny process Ukraine itself needs to be careful not to behave like a colonizer. This can only be avoided if the state prioritizes the indigenous Crimean Tatars in its de-occupation efforts.

The Crimean Tatars, who lived in Crimea long before it was conquered by the Russian empire in 1783, have demanded their right to self-determination since the last century. The Soviet Union, which occupied Crimea in 1920, deprived them of this right, and Joseph Stalin ordered the deportation of the whole nation to Central Asia in 1944. Ever since, the survivors have organized politically to demand their right to



Rifkhat Yakupov: "Here will be our house, my son".

return to their homeland, which in 1954 became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Returning to Crimea in the early 1990s, they advocated for autonomous status within independent Ukraine. This would have given the Crimean Tatars protection from the racial discrimination they ended up suffering from the ethnic Russian majority, who settled in the peninsula after the deportation and viciously opposed their return.

Constituting only 13 percent of the peninsula's population, the Crimean Tatars put their hopes on the Ukrainian state as it showed its potential for democratic transformation. Over the next twenty-five years, they voted for pro-Ukraine candidates, learned the Ukrainian language, and participated in the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

But Ukraine's governments, for the most part, gave the Crimean Tatars the cold shoulder, generally neglecting the region and their problems lest they provoke the pro-Russia population. No work has been done to address the vicious racism toward the Crimean Tatars that was a cause as well as a consequence of the unequal distribution of state resources, sharp economic inequalities, and disregard for basic human rights.

Nonetheless, the Crimean Tatars remained loyal to the Ukraini-

an state, when Russian troops took over the peninsula in 2014. For their outspoken position against its illegal annexation, they have been labeled Islamists and terrorists by the occupying authorities. A disproportionate number of Crimean Tatars have received sentences of 10–15 years on trumped up charges. Over 20,000 have been forced to relocate to mainland Ukraine, fearing for their safety. What has been witnessed in the country's regions occupied since February 2022—torture chambers, killing sites, absolute lawlessness—is very similar to what has been happening in Crimea to those who do not support Russia.

Ukraine's governments have taken some steps to address the demands of the Crimean Tatars, recognizing them as an indigenous people in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, legitimizing their self-government bodies (the Mejlis and the Kurtultay), and promoting their language and culture. In 2014, the government recognized the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944 as genocidal. A 2021 law "On Indigenous Peoples" enshrines their right to self-determination in Crimea. Two decades in the making, this has been seen largely as a symbolic gesture since it cannot be enforced while the peninsula is under Russian control. It will be Ukraine's

responsibility to ensure these were not mere gestures in the event of de-occupation.

While most Crimean Tatars, from mainland Ukraine and in the occupied peninsula, strongly support the goal of liberation, as shown by their number in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and in the underground resistance, Ukraine should not treat this support as unconditional. Finding a solution to handling the pro-Russia, ethnic Russian, and Russian citizens in a de-occupied peninsula will be incredibly challenging and could eclipse or sideline the Crimean Tatar question. The government should not repeat past mistakes by accommodating the pro-Russia majority there at the expense of the Crimean Tatars. Not only has this approach been deeply problematic from an ethical standpoint; it has also failed miserably to prevent the conflict.

A successful de-occupation and decolonization of Crimea requires subverting a power hierarchy that has always prioritized Russian and pro-Russia people there. The Crimean Tatars should not only have their rights as an indigenous people enforced and guaranteed; they should also be included in decision-making processes, restitution and retribution policies, environmental policies, and other important decisions. Some form of affirmative action will

be required to eliminate existing inequalities and to compensate for their disproportionate oppression over the past decade.

The legal right of the Ukrainian state to Crimea should not be an impediment to it facing up to historical guilt of its own. Although Ukraine has never colonized Crimea or the Crimean Tatars, which makes it inappropriate to conceptualize their relationship as colonial, old power relations and injustices are still present. Just as Ukraine will have to rethink its past crimes committed against Poles and Jews, or its current racism and homophobia, so will it have to reckon with its unjust treatment of the Crimean Tatars in the most recent past and during Soviet times. Ukraine will have to acknowledge its partial complicity in preventing the Crimean Tatars from returning to their land after Stalin's brutal deportation, as well as its most recent neglect and denial of their rights as equals to other residents of Crimea.

This reckoning will undoubtedly require equal effort by Ukraine's government and society. While it would be strange to expect Ukrainians to think about their own crimes at a time when they are the victims of Russia's genocide, these discussions are necessary for a more mature postwar democratic development and for purely security concerns in Crimea. Expecting unconditional loyalty from the Crimean Tatars without acknowledging their claims to the peninsula as an indigenous people would repeat past mistakes and lead to further destabilization of the region.

Ukrainians—who in recent years came to appreciate and love Crimean Tatar cuisine, coffee, and music—will have to extend their open-mindedness to the idea that their summer trip to a de-occupied peninsula would not necessarily be a homecoming but rather a guest visit. This attitude is necessary to cultivate mutual respect and boundaries, keep in check one's entitlement and privilege, and nourish long-term peaceful and amicable relationships. I remain optimistic that the Ukrainian state and society will rise to the challenge, just as they always do. <

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Should We Still Read Heidegger?

Yes, like Jan Patočka

BY JAMES CARTLIDGE

What could we possibly learn from a zealous, unrepentant Nazi? Academic philosophy seems to think “quite a lot,” since one of the twentieth century’s most influential philosophers was such a person. But in an age of “cancel culture,” “decolonializing the syllabus,” and writing problematic historical figures off as “dead white men,” should philosophers still be engaging with the ideas of such a person?



Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger revolutionized phenomenology, played an important role in the development of existentialism and hermeneutics, and influenced postmodern thought. Even analytic philosophers are now familiar with and write regularly about him, which would previously have been unthinkable. Heidegger’s influence is felt even beyond philosophy. His essay *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* has been discussed in architectural research. His writings on technology are taken seriously by environmental theorists. Entire approaches to psychoanalysis have been developed based on Heidegger, and his work has inspired the films of Terrence Malick.

The impact that Heidegger had on philosophy means that he cannot be ignored by philosophers. But equally, we cannot ignore his antisemitism, avowed support of Nazism, his disgusting political machinations during the Second World War, his lack of remorse or any convincing apology after it, and, most importantly, his lifelong public silence about the systematic extermination of Jews in Nazi gas chambers. Can an engagement with Heidegger’s philosophy lead anywhere beyond contributing to an understanding of the psychology of antisemitism?

Heidegger has justifiably been criticized for his Nazism, with some suggesting that philosophers should abandon their reverence toward his work, despite the effect it had on Western thought. Without Heidegger, the work of Hannah Arendt, Jean-

Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl Jaspers, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Luc Nancy, Richard Rorty, Herbert Marcuse and many others would arguably have been very different. Phenomenology and existentialism would certainly have been very different.

We cannot just airbrush Heidegger out. Perhaps we should just keep reading him as normal, separate the work from the man, and comfort ourselves with the knowledge that sometimes bad people write good books. But this is hardly convincing—the matter is much more complicated.

The debate about the depth of Heidegger’s Nazism and the relationship between his politics and his philosophy has been unfolding in academia for decades. It was inflamed again recently by the publication of the notorious, explicitly antisemitic content of the *Black Notebooks*. Heidegger remains a serious dilemma for philosophers: we cannot ignore him but we cannot pretend his Nazism bears no consequence for how we approach studying him. It is a fact that should inform how we read him. The question is how to do so.

The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka’s reception of Heidegger is instructive. Patočka studied under Edmund Husserl and Heidegger, and the influences of both are clearly felt in his philosophy. Patočka discussed Heidegger often, demonstrating an intimate familiarity with and respect for his phenomenology, especially what he calls “the master-


ly analysis”¹ of *Being and Time*. But Patočka was no uncritical disciple, nor did he shy away from discussing politics, as Heidegger deliberately does in *Being and Time*.

Patočka was incisively critical of Heidegger’s philosophy and built on it in ways the latter never would have attempted. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger sought after the “existential structures” of *Dasein*, defined as the entity that we are, which can raise the question of what “being” means. Existential structures are things that no instance of *Dasein* is without, like mortality, affectivity, and meaning, which also function as conditions for the possibility of our type of existence.

Heidegger argued that his analysis of *Dasein* operated at such a fundamental level that he was effectively precluded from making claims about humanity specifically. He was dealing with “being,” not “human being,” interested only in *Dasein* (which is not necessarily limited to human beings), and solely concerned with the question of the meaning of “being.” Anything else was an unwarranted, unjustified distraction. Heidegger often broke off lines of inquiry at points when they would become more illuminating for human life or encroach on ethical questions because it would have distracted from the object of the investigation. This is why he deliberately avoided discussing politics in *Being and Time*, even though it contains an analysis of *Dasein*’s being-social and descriptions of how *Dasein* interacts with fellow *Daseins*. Heidegger viewed his work as the ground of future theorizing of any kind, including ethical or political theory. His philosophy could not be part of what it was supposed to ground.

Patočka saw a lot of promise in Heidegger’s phenomenology but did not agree that it lacked political relevance or did not concern human existence as such. In the form of his “three movements of human life,” Patočka’s phenomenology also attempts to specify “existential structures” of human existence, yet his theorizing of these structures was a far cry from Heidegger’s austere ontological language, instead referring to explicitly political ideas.

The movement of “acceptance” occurs upon first entering the world. In it, we become accepting of our situation and are accepted into a social community. Without this two-way movement of acceptance, we would



Jan Patočka

not be able to live—acceptance is a condition for the possibility of being the kind of entity we are, something that structures every case of human existence. Though Heidegger discussed social being, such a notion of “acceptance” would be completely foreign to his early phenomenological analysis. The movement of “self-surrender” (also called “work and struggle”) shows how the pragmatic world of tools and equipment that Heidegger discussed is also the world of work, and it is the collective human participation in work that sustains our shared world, so labor is also a condition for the possibility and continued sustenance of our being. This is also somewhere Heidegger would not have gone.

Patočka showed that the very things Heidegger sought to avoid in his analysis, or thought were not fundamental enough to be part of it, can be discovered by examining humanity’s existential structures and deserve to be acknowledged as fundamental to our shared existence. Patočka’s engagement with Heidegger was simultaneously positive and negative: he built on Heidegger’s system but refused to be contained by its author’s estimation of its significance and ideas about how it should be used. Patočka’s attitude toward reading Heidegger, and the need for this attitude, was captured well by Derrida: “Without Heidegger’s terrible silence, we would not feel the imperative addressed to our responsibility, the need to read Heidegger as he did not read himself.”²

To this end, Patočka critically dismantled and reassembled Heidegger’s work, paying as much attention to what Heidegger did not say as what he did say, using his phenomenological tools to move beyond the confines of his original project and to reveal their latent, unintended potential.

Ironically, this is how Heidegger recommended we read the history of philosophy, in a manner he called a “destruction” or “destructive retrieval,” something akin to what Derrida called “deconstruction.” Accusing the history of philosophy of neglecting or “forgetting” the question of being, Heidegger suggested we take a hammer to tradition, “destroying” the mistakes and elements that would hinder our current pursuits while “retrieving” anything that would help us, even and especially when this contradicts the original intentions of their authors. When it comes to someone as important yet problematic as Heidegger, we should follow Patočka’s example and “destructively retrieve” him. ◀

1) Patočka, J. *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*. Trans. Erika Abrams. Northwestern University Press, Illinois, 2016.
2) Derrida, J. *Heidegger’s Schweigen*. In: Emil Kettering, Günther Neske (eds.): *Antwort. Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*. Klett-Cotta, 1988, p. 160.

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Castoriadis and the Question of Truth

BY YANNIS KTENAS

In a time of “post-truth” and “fake news,” when the question of what is true and what is not keeps arising, Cornelius Castoriadis’s epistemology—placing the problem of truth at the heart of social-historical procedures but also refusing to reduce truth to an arbitrary social construction—gains new relevance.

Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997) is mostly known for his contributions in the fields of radical political philosophy and psychoanalysis. From his early writings as a co-founding member of the *Socialisme ou barbarie* review, in which he criticized in depth the regime in the Soviet Union as “bureaucratic capitalism,” to his mature work on social imaginary, psyche, autonomy, and direct democracy, Castoriadis always tried to conceive society as a special type of being and to elucidate the indissociably collective and subjective preconditions of human freedom.

Dealing with the question of truth was a crucial moment in this intellectual endeavor. Nevertheless, this particular side of the Castoriadean oeuvre is not widely known. Highlighting the epistemological aspects of Castoriadis’s philosophy can be quite fruitful at a time when the problem of truth emerges often and dramatically from several directions and in various forms.

Nowadays, societies are characterized by an ambivalent attitude toward truth. On the one hand, a consensus regarding the non-absolute nature of factual claims seems to have been established, in parallel with the proliferation of digital media and informal sources of information. On the other, political forces and social actors constantly try to show that their opponents’ claims are false and to prove the truthfulness of their own ones. The never-ending discussions over “fake news,” “alternative facts,” and “post-truth” are quite telling in this respect.

Could the Castoriadean philosophical concepts help in dealing with this conundrum? At the core of Castoriadis’s social ontology is the idea of social imaginary. Apart from the imagination of individual subjects, there is also a collective form of imagination that incessantly creates significations. These social imaginary significations bestow life and the world with meaning. Furthermore, they are embodied in each society’s institutions, guiding collective and individual action and providing each social structure with its uniqueness and specificity. Examples of such fundamental imaginary significations can be found in the ancient Greek representations of Chaos and Cosmos, in the image of God-creator in Christianity, in the Hinduistic notion of Karma, and in the capitalist imperatives regarding limitless growth and rational control over life on this planet.



Dimitris Chaliassos,
Cornelius Castoriadis (2017).

All these significations, which in various times and social worlds have oriented human actions and led to divergent institutional creations, share a common feature: they do not stem from a uniform human reason, nor do they emanate from a common moral ground or the nature of “reality as such.” Quite the contrary: it is exactly these significations that determine what is to be considered rational or irrational, natural or abnormal, moral or immoral, and right or wrong within the frames of each society. Moreover, they shape the institutions (for example, school, sexual codes, and tribunals) that realize this consideration. This is precisely what the title of Castoriadis’s magnum opus, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, indicates.

According to Castoriadis, imagination and reality are not juxtaposed but rather intertwined; the imaginary is a constitutive element of the real. Furthermore, he describes the social imaginary as radical, meaning that the perpetual creativity and spontaneity characterizing it are irreducible. Social imaginary is not dictated by nature but rather shapes nature. This is why so dissimilar worldviews, institutions, and anthropological types are to be found in different societies and eras.

There are, however, *some* limits that the radical creativity of the imaginary encounters. Among the

most significant is what Castoriadis calls the first natural stratum. This is a kind of pre-social substrate that social institutions “run into” and are obliged to “take into consideration.” Institutions are not determined by it; rather, they find in it supports, obstacles, handles, and impediments that must be dealt with. Social institutions transform all these in a creative way, but they cannot completely disregard them.

A practical example of this can be found in the social-historical institution of food. In different societies, which may even use the same means of production and live under similar geographical and ecological conditions, the animals and plants that are considered edible vary. Indeed, it is quite common that the gastronomic choices of one culture causes disgust to people belonging to other ones. What we eat is not “natural”—the specific content of nutrition is determined through the social imaginary. Nevertheless, the imaginary has to take some boundaries of human biology into consideration: if we do not consume a certain quantity of calories for a certain time period, we will die, while there are substances that make us fall sick when we eat them.

This ontological notion of the first natural stratum is of great importance for Castoriadis’s epistemology. He conceives knowledge

as part of social-historical action, making the point that each society creates its own criteria for right and wrong, along with its proper categories for thinking and organizing reality. However, this idea does not lead Castoriadis to a completely constructivist conceptualization of truth and knowledge. The reason for this is that various forms of knowledge—including scientific theories—must somehow correspond to the first natural stratum, something that raises certain demands and poses certain limitations.

This means that there is not one single way to approach truth; as already noted, the creations of social imaginary, which include scientific creations, too, are radical and are not immediately dictated by the reality of nature. However, truthful epistemic creations can be discerned from the creativity of a delirium, for example, on the ground that they lean on, find support in, and successfully coordinate with certain elements of the natural world that exists “out there.” Moreover, one could argue that the richer and the more fruitful a certain form of knowledge is, the more suitable it becomes to correspond with and “take into account” more strata or areas of the being. This perhaps explains how it is possible to find at various times and across all civilizations correct, although not equally comprehensive, conceptions of the

world, which all started from radically different premises.

The thoughts developed and the examples given so far seem to only refer to a rather limited conception of truth, namely claims regarding natural and biological “data” as well as their social-historical “transformation.” While this conception can be useful when it comes to problems such as the severity of a virus, it leaves open the question of truth concerning historical and social phenomena as such. Paradoxically, this topic remains rather underdeveloped in Castoriadis’s writings. However, in some of his late texts he holds that past cultural creations form a sort of sociohistorical sedimentation, which cannot be treated as “indeterminate material.” Cultural traditions and historical events are constantly and creatively reinterpreted but cannot be described or manipulated arbitrarily—they have to find support in the sedimentated stock of the past.

Castoriadis never subscribed to any form of epistemological relativism, although he always stressed the variety, the abundance, and occasionally even the incompatibility of cultural creations coming from different civilizations and eras. Unlike, for example, Michel Foucault, who focused on the political and power implications of discourses on truth but in a way that the question of what is true becomes rather irrelevant, Castoriadis tried to find a fecund balance between the political, social, and cultural determinants of knowledge and the necessity of developing valid criteria for it.

While knowledge is socially produced, it aims nevertheless at encountering and thematizing what is not entirely reduced to the socio-cultural context and the power relations of each time. It is in this sense that Castoriadis defines truth as a *movement that breaks through enclosure and entrenchment*, not only in already existing narratives and inherited views but also in the social environment of oneself, in our very own bubble, in the already used paths and methods of thinking, which must be penetrated in order to meet with the other, the new, the different, the still unknown, and the up-to-now inconceivable. ◀

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Philosophie und der „Sinn“ des Krieges

VON LUDGER HAGEDORN

In den aktuellen Auseinandersetzungen um den russischen Überfall auf die Ukraine zeigt sich, wie illusionär der Glaube war, dass der Krieg zu den vergangenen Epochen der Menschheit zählt. In der Philosophie war der Krieg auf durchaus kontroverse Weise immer präsent, wie diese kurze Zusammenschau zeigt.

Seit den Anfängen der Philosophie war der Krieg ein zentraler Gegenstand ihrer Reflexion. Weite Teile der vorplatonischen Philosophie sehen den Krieg als ein natürlich gegebenes und notwendiges Faktum des menschlichen Miteinanders in der Gesellschaft. Das bekannte (und dunkle) Diktum des Heraklit sagt sogar, der Krieg (*Polemos*) sei „der Vater aller Dinge“, und es sei der Streit, durch den alles entstehe.¹

Platon erläutert in den *Nomoi*, dass sich die Gesetzgebung am Frieden, nicht am Krieg, orientieren soll, weil die Gesetze auf das Beste hinzielen sollen und der Friede eben diesen besten Zustand für die Bürger darstellt (*Nomoi* 628 c–e). Dennoch werden Training und Vorbereitungen zum Krieg, wie in der *Politeia* geschildert, als unabänderliche Notwendigkeit für die Gewährleistung der Sicherheit der Polis bestimmt.

Mit der Neuzeit und ihren Staatenkriegen verändert sich auch der Blick auf den Krieg und weitet sich auf das Weltgeschichtliche. Kants programmatische Schrift *Zum Ewigen Frieden* entwirft das Modell eines Friedensvertrags, mit dem die Grundsätze seiner praktischen Philosophie auf die Politik und das Miteinander der Staaten gewendet werden sollen. Die Notwendigkeit des Vertrages beruht jedoch darauf, dass der Friede gerade nicht als natürlicher Zustand der Menschheit angesetzt wird, so dass die Überwindung des Krieges vertraglich gestiftet werden muss. Kants Geschichtsphilosophie bleibt dem moralischen Subjekt verpflichtet und unterstreicht in der kritischen Idee eines „ewigen Friedens“ die normativen und regulativen Implikationen dieses Bestrebens.

Entscheidend und diskursprägend wurde aber darüber hinaus in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie vor allem Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit dem *Topos* im Rahmen seines dialektischen Denkmodells: Darin wird dem Krieg zwar letztlich keine wesentliche Rolle im ‚Weltgericht‘ der Geschichte zugesprochen, seine vermittelnde (bzw. schiedsrichterliche) Rolle, die Kants Projekt eines „ewigen Friedens“ untergräbt, jedoch eindeutig affirmiert. Die „höhere Bedeutung“ des Krieges beruht auf seinem Vermögen, den „faulen Stillstand“, in den ein ewiger Friede die Welt versetzen würde, zu erschüttern. Hegels Geschichtsphilosophie betrachtet Kriege somit als notwendige und sinnvolle Entwick-



Alfred Kubin, *Der Krieg*, 1907.

lungsschritte. Der Krieg erfüllt diese weltgeschichtliche Funktion, insofern durch ihn „die sittliche Gesundheit der Völker in ihrer Indifferenz gegen das Festwerden der endlichen Bestimmtheiten erhalten wird, wie die Bewegung der Winde die See vor der Fäulnis bewahrt...“² Ein dauernder oder gar ewiger Friede wäre diesem Verständnis nach ein Stillstand, mit dem der Fortgang der Geschichte erlahmte und die Freiheit geopfert würde. Hierin spricht sich grundsätzlich die leitende Überzeugung aus, dass Krieg nicht einfach irrational ist, sondern als wesentliche Bestimmung der Wirklichkeit zu gelten hat und ein Prinzip des historischen Fortschritts verkörpert. Diese insbesondere von der klassischen deutschen Philosophie nachhaltig artikulierte Idee bleibt ein polemischer Stachel für jede pazifistische Welthaltung.

Ein ähnlicher Ekel vor der Fäulnis eines als falsch und dekadent empfundenen europäischen Friedens war es auch, der vor mehr als hundert Jahren die Völker freudig gestimmt in die Abgründe des Ersten Weltkriegs trieb. Im Rückblick auf dieses europäische Fanal, die „Urkatastrophe“ Europas, wirkt die bellizistische Grundhaltung von Philosophen, Literaten und Künstlern dieser Zeit bis heute verstörend. Ihre

Hoffnungen und Sehnsüchte richteten sich massiv auf die erlösende Kraft des Krieges. Geradezu paradigmatisch schrieb etwa der Künstler Franz Marc: „Die Welt will rein werden, sie will den Krieg. (...) Um Reinigung wird der Krieg geführt und das kranke Blut vergossen.“³

Der Philosoph Max Scheler publizierte im Jahr 1915 eine Schrift über den „Genius des Krieges“⁴, in der er einerseits die Auffassung vertrat, dass der Krieg ein Resultat und eine Verfallsform des Kapitalismus sei – eine Auffassung, die auch im linken politischen Spektrum großen Anklang findet –, andererseits den Krieg zu einer Art Wiedergeburt und geistigen Reinigung des Menschen stilisierte. Bezeichnenderweise stellt er seiner Schrift ein Motto aus der Zeit der klassischen deutschen Philosophie voran: „Aber der Krieg auch hat seine Ehre, der Bewegte des Menschenschicksals – ein Zitat Friedrich Schillers, in dem sich deutlich die Ansicht vom Krieg als Relais des weltgeschichtlichen Fortschritts spiegelt.“

Nach dem Ende des realpolitischen Krieges änderte Scheler seine weltanschaulichen Auffassungen zum vermeintlichen „Genius“ des Krieges grundsätzlich. Wie für ihn und viele seiner Generation war die traumatisierende Erfahrung des

Krieges ein Erlebnis, das alles veränderte und bei europäischen Intellektuellen zu einem Umdenken und einer grundlegenden Neuorientierung über Sinn und Ziel von Kriegen führte. Neben einer dezidiert pazifistischen Haltung, die Kriege nur als Einbruch von destruktiver Gewalt sehen kann und ihnen grundsätzlich jede Bedeutung, jeden Sinn und Zweck für die soziale Welt abspricht, gab es aber auch die verbreitete Überzeugung, dass die Erfahrung des Krieges etwas Wesentliches über menschliche Existenz mitzuteilen vermag – als unverstellter Blick auf das „nackte Leben“, Überwindung der Dekadenz etc.

Was solche vermeintlich metaphysisch-existentialen Potentiale des Krieges jedoch fundamental in Frage stellte, war dann in weiterer geschichtlicher Folge gerade die Erfahrung des Zweiten Weltkriegs, der mit seiner Maschinerie des Tötens, des ethnisch begründeten Massenmordes und der Vernichtungslager jede Frage nach einem „Sinn“ dieses Geschehens wie Spott erscheinen ließ. Im Anschluss an das berühmte Diktum des preußischen Generals Clausewitz „Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln“⁵ herrschte lange eine Auslegungstendenz vor, den Krieg

als politische Möglichkeit zu denken. Diese Möglichkeit schien nun ausgeschlossen – einhergehend damit auch das Bestreben, dem Krieg einen „Sinn“ abzurufen. Die Vorstellung vom konventionellen Krieg im Sinne einer durch das Völkerrecht zu hegenden politischen *Option*, also ein grundsätzlich *begrenzbare* Phänomen, das etwa noch die klassische deutsche Philosophie im Auge hatte, wird abgelöst durch die Konfrontation mit etwas, das man bezeichnenderweise „Weltkrieg“ nennt. Das Überschießende und Neue an diesem Phänomen besteht nicht nur darin, dass die Bedrohung des Krieges sich in einem potentiell globalen Maßstab entfaltet, sondern in der Totalität, mit der es in alle menschlichen Lebenszusammenhänge eingreift und diese im Zeichen des Krieges reorganisiert. Der Krieg wird zu einem ontologischen Prozess, der auch die Reflexion selbst bestimmt: eine Allpräsenz der Gewalt, mit der die grundlegende Unterscheidung von Krieg und Frieden unterlaufen wird. Jan Patočka hat dem im Titel seines sechsten und letzten *Ketzerischen Essays* Ausdruck verliehen, wenn er den Krieg zur wesentlichen Instanz eines ganzen Jahrhunderts macht: „Die Kriege des 20. Jahrhunderts und das 20. Jahrhundert als Krieg“.

Die Sinnlosigkeit des kriegerischen Treibens im 20. Jahrhundert war es, die viele an eine neue Sinngebung glauben ließ: der Krieg gegen den Krieg als beinahe eschatologische Verheißung einer neuen Menschheit und eines neuen Lebens. Es gehört zu den verstörenden wie auch hell-sichtigen Momenten von Patočkas Denken, dass er diese weltliche Eschatologie für eine neue Ideologie und unzureichende Verflachung hält. Die politische Wirklichkeit unserer Gegenwart zeugt davon. <

1) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Diels/Kranz), Griechisch und Deutsch von Hermann Diels, Hg. von Walther Kranz, Hildesheim, B 52.
2) Ebd. B 80.
3) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, Dritter Teil, Dritter Abschnitt, II. „Die Souveränität gegen außen“, §324, S. 491f.
4) *Franz Marc Schriften*, hg. v. Klaus Lankheit, Köln 1978, 163f.
5) Scheler, Max: *Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg*, Leipzig: Verlag der Weißen Bücher 1915.
2) Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Buch I, Kap. 1, Abs. 24.

Reconstructing Marxist Humanism(s) in Yugoslavia

BY UNA BLAGOJEVIĆ

Approaching Marxist humanism in Yugoslavia from the perspective of intellectual history allows us to reconstruct the complexities of this political language and to understand the existence of different discourses of humanism and human rights that emerged in the context of post-1948 Yugoslavia.



Discussion during a break at the Korčula summer school in front of the Cultural Centre. From the left: Rudi Supek, Milan Kangrga, secretary Đurđa Purić, Mihailo Marković, Danko Grlić (turned with his back), to the very right unidentified.

In her article “Testaments Betrayed,” Laura Secor discusses the shock of many Western academics at the swift transformations of critical, Marxist humanist intellectuals in Yugoslavia in the context of the 1980s and of the country’s violent dissolution in the 1990s. She asked: “Who could have known that one of the *Praxis* philosophers would later become vice president of Milosevic’s party—and its chief ideologue during the Bosnian war?”


Between 1963 and 1974, Marxist humanist intellectuals around the journal *Praxis* organized the international Korčula Summer School, at which they promoted critical and anti-dogmatic approaches to Marxist theory while stressing the importance of personal autonomy, dignity, moral value, freedom, and creativity. Why did some of the internationally connected and humanist-oriented intellectuals adopt integral ethnonationalist ideological and political positions? The question becomes even more interesting given the fact that the Yugoslav intellectuals, just like dissident intellectuals in East Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, used the language of human rights and demanded the limiting of the monopoly of power in the hands of a party and its elite. Similarly to their positions in the 1980s, Marxist humanists in Yugoslavia from the mid-1950s insisted that human emancipation could only be achieved if Marxism

(and socialism) took a human being as their starting point.

Thus, two puzzles emerge when engaging with Marxist humanists in Yugoslavia: what was the path to human rights and how did they approach them, and how does the ethnonationalist political positioning of some intellectuals fit into the humanist philosophical standpoint. Two research avenues can bring us close to tackling these puzzles. First, instead of approaching Marxist humanism in Yugoslavia as a stable and homogenous intellectual position, it is important to reconstruct it as a political language that had universal horizons and included a diversity of philosophical positions that were also adapted to their own context. Second, from this perspective Marxist humanism made possible a whole spectrum of different options, some of which were disregarded and, especially in the shadow of the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, the ethnonationalist option won out.

Transnational Encounters

Yugoslavia’s expulsion from Cominform in 1948 led intellectuals to an early engagement with existentialism, personalism, critical theory, and other philosophical streams. The critique of Stalinism was initiated by the Yugoslav leadership in its attempt at formulating a new interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The



shared position among intellectuals was that Marxism was not a dogma but a living theory that ought to be rethought and reinvigorated according to the demands and contradictions of social realities. While the Communist Party’s undertaking of the Yugoslav path to socialism—self-management—played a major role in the consciousness of the young generation of intellectuals (some had participated in the People’s Liberation War), they started to diverge in their emphasis on the importance of the individual, the existence of alienation in socialist societies (including their own), and the growing social stratification. While taking a historic step toward achieving an alternative to Western capitalism and to Soviet socialism, the Yugoslav leadership started to be criticized by some Marxist human-

ists for not keeping its promise of working toward a humanist socialism, or a genuine self-management.

For a decade (1963–1974) the Korčula Summer School, organized by a circle of Marxist humanists, was a meeting place for intellectuals from mainly Western countries (including the United States) but also Eastern Europe. The participants included Herbert Marcuse, Ernst Bloch, Lucien Goldmann, Ágnes Heller, Henri Lefebvre, and many others. Their growing critique of Yugoslav society focused on the ever-firmer entrenchment of the political bureaucracy through economic liberalization and foreign capital. Marcuse’s insight into the dynamics of “affluent society”—the lack of genuine freedom, the existence of various kinds of alienation in modern, consumer societies—and his thematizations of the growing ontological and existential crisis of humanity faced with the development of technology analyzed by Martin Heidegger, C. Wright Mills, and others were also used, and these critiques were applied to Yugoslav socialism. While demanding that socialism must be democratic (in the sense of guaranteeing freedoms), they criticized the rising of the managerial class or technosturcture reminiscent of classical bourgeoisie. Their transnational outlook positioned them critically toward capitalist and socialist industrialized societies alike as they saw in both a tendency toward social and economic organization that was run on the basis of efficiency and productivity.

Humanism(s)

In most of their debates, the Yugoslav intellectuals started from the individual, yet their interaction with different intellectual references and contexts resulted in diverging analyses, demands, and grievances.

Given such a wide array of intellectual references—and in the case of *Praxis*, mainly European-oriented interactions—it is impossible to talk about a homogeneous group of Yugoslav Marxists. Yet, their joint efforts could be described as humanist. In recovering the European socialist philosophical trajectory of Marxism that was lost due to Stalinist distortions, they dedicated themselves to recovering humanist aspects of Marxist thought. At the same time, what humanism meant to these intellectuals was not always clear. Competing philosophical move-

ments had a humanistic character—personalism, phenomenology, existentialism, naturalism, and others. Humanism was a contested concept as early as the 1950s. It circulated in various intellectual and political debates, and was shared in different academic and political milieus that often had different or contested assumptions about its meanings. At the same time, the Yugoslav Marxists saw Marxism as a cluster of diverse orientations and warned that not all of them could be seen as humanism. Freedom of thought and inquiry, freedom of speech and publication, and the rights of opposition, election, and petition were all necessary preconditions of a humane, socialist society. Marxism according to them was humanism, and its aim was to unify theory and practical action.

Analysis of the adjustment from humanist and universalist orientations toward particularist and ethnonational political and philosophical positions by some of the Yugoslav intellectuals, can benefit from the discussions that question the liberal reading of human rights theory. Starting with the assumption that the meaning of human rights is not stable, it is possible to reconstruct the different paths to using the concept of human rights by the intellectuals in Yugoslavia. Looking at how their intellectual references, conceptual frameworks, and philosophical approaches developed in relation to the context in which they operated could help us understand how a universal concept of humanity became replaced by that of a particular nation.

In her study of post-Stalinist Bulgaria, Zhivka Valiavicharska convincingly illustrates how the rise of humanism opened the discursive conditions for the rise of ethnonationalism through the convergence of the humanist visions of socialist freedom and peoplehood with ethnonationalist monism. In the case of Yugoslav Marxists, humanism included a whole array of intellectual positions, some of which combined ethnonationalist grievances with the languages of human rights, precisely because the latter was gaining ground in the Western liberal circles and thus had a potential to exonerate what could otherwise be seen as a primordialist position. <

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Geschichte ist nicht woanders: Das aktuelle Vermächtnis der Dissidenz

VON RADKA DENEMARKOVÁ

In ihrem Roman *Stunden aus Blei* schildert Radka Denemarková das Verschwinden einer jungen Dissidentin im heutigen China, die sich von den Schriften Václav Havels inspirieren ließ. Nach der Publikation des Buches wurde die Autorin vom chinesischen Regime mit einem Einreiseverbot belegt. Blickend auf China, reflektiert sie über das aktuelle Vermächtnis der Dissidenz.

Die Charta 77 war der erste bedeutende Akt der Solidarität im kommunistischen Mittelosteuropa. Sie schuf eine Atmosphäre von Gleichheit, Gemeinschaft und eine Bereitschaft zur gegenseitigen Hilfe. Milan Kunderas a priori skeptische Haltung gegenüber bürgerrechtlichen Aktionen, die keine Aussicht auf Erfolg oder gar Effekt haben, teilten die Initiator:innen der Charta, namentlich Václav Havel, nicht. Sie waren der Ansicht, dass aus Prinzip gehandelt werden muss, wenn Menschen zu Unrecht inhaftiert sind. Als diese aus ihrer Isolation zurückkehrten, sagten sie übereinstimmend, dass solche Petitionen eine große Stütze für sie waren, gaben sie ihnen doch das Gefühl, dass sogar ihr Gefängnisaufenthalt einen Sinn hatte. Mehr als die Leute „draußen“ wussten sie, dass die Bedeutung solcher Interventionen weit über die Frage hinausgeht, ob bzw. wann jemand entlassen wird. Das Wissen, dass jemand auf ihrer Seite war und nicht zögerte, vor dem Hintergrund allgemeiner Apathie und Resignation sich öffentlich ihrer Sache anzunehmen, hatte für sie einen unschätzbaren Wert. Ähnlich haben es später die kurdische Autorin und Politikerin Hevrin Khalaf oder der chinesische Schriftsteller Liu Xiaobo empfunden, und so empfinden es immer noch Leute wie die türkische Autorin Aslı Erdoğan.

Viele sind heute vom chinesischen Modell eines wirtschaftlich erfolgreichen, Wohlstand versprechenden, kapitalistisch-kommunistischen Polizeistaates fasziniert. Doch die chinesische Prosperität dient einem einzigen Zweck: die Demokratie zu umgehen. Die Reformen sind dazu da, den Kommunismus am Leben zu halten. China hat aus dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion und aus der Geschichte Osteuropas eine Lehre gezogen: Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in den ehemals kommunistischen Staaten träumte nicht von Demokratie oder Freiheit, sondern von materiellen Gütern. Im Westen lebte es sich besser. In der DDR, einer „harmonischen und stabilisierten“ Gesellschaft – wie heute einige tschechische Politiker China gerne bezeichnen –, war die Opposition zersplittert und unruhig. Anders als die tschechische Charta 77 oder die



Warschau, 17. September 2011

polnische *Solidarność* verfügte sie über keine gemeinsame Plattform. Das lag nicht nur an der allgegenwärtigen Staatssicherheit, sondern auch daran, dass die Hauptstadt Ost-Berlin ein wesentlich größeres Angebot an Konsumwaren hatte als die anderen Zentren der kommunistischen Welt. Nur eine Gesellschaft, die ihre Konsument:innen halbwegs zufrieden stellt, kann sich stabilisieren.

Wenn sie heute nach Peking reisen, bringen Politiker:innen oder Diplomaten aus Europa die Arbeitslager, die Laogais, nicht ins Gespräch. Täten sie es, würden ihre chinesischen Ansprechpartner:innen wortlos den Raum verlassen – und mit ihnen würde die Hoffnung auf Investitionen in Millionenhöhe verschwinden. Die europäische Diplomatie reißt sich heute wegen einer: Inhaftierten kein Bein aus. Nicht anders sieht es in Tschechien aus, und das obwohl einst in den westlichen Medien sofort über jede:n Inhaftierte:n des tschechoslowakischen Kommunismus berichtet wurde und westdeutsche Schriftsteller wie Heinrich Böll und Günter Grass konkrete Hilfe organisierten und das Land bereisten.

Heutige Diplomaten meinen, die Dissidenz gehe sie nichts an; es sei unhöflich, den Gastgeber zu beleidigen. Nicht einmal aus Protest gegen den Tod des Schriftstellers und Nobelpreisträgers Liu Xiaobo

verlassen die Politiker:innen dieser Welt ihre Delegationen. Geschäft ist Geschäft. Sie machen sich lustig und zitieren Kafka, den sie nicht gelesen haben: Das Böse weiß vom Guten, aber das Gute vom Bösen nicht. Sie sind nach China gefahren, um das Böse kennenzulernen, und halten sich für das Gute.

Niemand ist bereit, eine Petition zu unterschreiben. Im letzten Jahrhundert mögen Petitionen sinnvoll gewesen sein, so das Mantra, heute würden sie jedoch von niemandem gelesen, die Mächtigen würden sich nur unnötig gereizt fühlen, man würde die Autoritäten vor Ort provozieren; eine wirklich unnötige Entblößung und Proteste der Unangepassten würden ohnehin nichts ändern. Da hatte Milan Kundera recht: Dissident:innen haben den Bezug zur Realität verloren. Kein Tibet, keine Dissidenzbewegung, keine uigurische Minderheit, keine Mitglieder der religiös-politischen Bewegung Falun Gong, von denen es mehr gibt als KP-Mitglieder; blind auf beiden Augen.

Bücher von Václav Havel lassen sich im heutigen Peking manchmal auftreiben, mal wieder nicht. Das wechselt ständig. Entscheidet sich die Partei für einen härteren Kurs, landet Havel wieder auf der schwarzen Liste der streng verbotenen Autor:innen. Er ist das Idol der jungen chinesischen Dissidenz, sie

beten ihn genauso an wie früher die ostdeutschen und polnischen Intellektuellen, deren Manifeste er inspirierte. Seine Konzepte vom „Leben in der Wahrheit“ und von der „Macht der Machtlosen“, sein Mahnen zu einer neuen nationalen Wiedergeburt und existenziellen Revolution kennt man auf der ganzen Welt. In seiner Person bündelt sich die Hoffnung auch deshalb, weil er bis zum Schluss nicht nur die Geschichte seiner Bücher, sondern auch die seines eigenen Lebens in der Hand behielt, und zwar bis zum letzten absurden Kapitel und der abschließenden Umkehrung: Er wurde Präsident des Landes, das ihn mundtot gemacht, mit Arbeitsverbot belegt und immer wieder ins Gefängnis gebracht hatte.

Die breite Masse in China versteht nicht, wozu Dissident:innen gut sind. Was wollen diese Leute eigentlich? Was haben sie vor? Was vermag ein Hühnerei gegen den Mühlstein? Sie kennen das Wort Dissens nicht, und ähnlich wie die nach Tibet verfrachteten Analphabeten vom Land kennen sie den Kontext nicht und laufen ihrer glücklichen Reisschale hinterher. Sie kriegen zwei. Wer meint, Kommunismus bedeute Gleichheit, sollte nach China kommen. Die Städte Peking und Shanghai vermitteln einen falschen Eindruck. Das Land ist arm, und die Menschen drängen in die Städte. Für die Städter sind Dörfler keine richtigen Menschen.

Ist man arm, ist man zu einem guten Drittel schlecht; Reichtum deckt die meisten Fehler.

Für die Kommunisten Chinas hat der Konfuzianismus seine religiöse Kraft verloren. Konfuzianische Werte werden jedoch mit aller Macht gefördert, um die Untergebenen, die das rasante Tempo des Wandels, der neue Materialismus, der Generationenabgründ erschreckt, zu beschwichtigen. Es ist, als hätte man ganze Lebensstadien übersprungen. Die Kommunisten machen sich die konfuzianische Moral zunutze: Autoritätshörigkeit und Familienzusammenhalt als Grundlage der moralischen Werte. Beides wird als Begründung des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs herangezogen. Gehorsamkeit dem Herrscher gegenüber – ob er nun Kaiser heißt oder Kommunistische Partei – steckt dem Land in den Knochen. Mehr als zweitausend Jahre wurde China durch Religion und Konfuzius' Sittenlehre geformt.

Die chinesische Charta 08 ließ sich von der Charta 77 inspirieren, die 1977 in der Tschechoslowakei die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte gefordert hatte. Die Charta 08 wurde im Dezember 2008 in China von über dreihundert Intellektuellen unterschrieben, mindestens ein Regierungsmitglied war auch dabei. Edle Menschen sind eben nie in der Mehrheit. Auch unter den dreitausend Schülern des Konfuzius gab es nur zweiundsiebzig Gelehrte und zwölf Weise. Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert war ein Jahrhundert des Genozids an Charaktermenschen, ein Jahrhundert ermordeter Noblesse – im Krieg oder Todeslagern ausgelöscht, unter Stalin hingerichtet, vertrieben. In China mögen Gespräche freundschaftlich und in geselliger Druschba-Atmosphäre verlaufen und Dissident:innen realitätsfremd sein. Václav Havel ist jedoch wie Gift in die chinesische Gesellschaft eingesickert. Die chinesische Dissidenz hält seinen Namen hoch wie eine Fahne, verkriecht sich mit ihrem tschechischen Pendant in den Untergrund. Ein moralischer Mensch kann sich nicht auf die Rolle des Zuschauers zurückziehen. ◀

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How International Law Can Restore Democracy

BY KIM LANE SCHEPPELE

Since the turn of the millennium, democracy has weakened around the world and some democracies have failed. How can robust democracy be bolstered without falling victim to accusations of partisan bias and tit-for-tat retaliation? The answer lies in taking international law seriously.

In 1989, the participants in the Hungarian Round Table Talks inadvertently drafted a new constitution. The communist regime's Justice Ministry came to the talks determined to use the opportunity to revise the 1949 Stalinist standard-issue text but the self-appointed democratic opposition was determined to postpone constitutional drafting until after an independent elected government could legitimate the process. In the end, they compromised and produced a massive amendment to the 1949 constitution, approved by the outgoing communist parliament on October 23, 1989, two weeks before the Berlin Wall fell.

International law made it possible to break the deadlock. The delegation from the justice ministry persuaded the opposition to cross out the parts of the 1949 constitution that were clearly not going to survive a democratic transition. Both parties then agreed that the now-nearly-empty text could be filled by copy-pasting the language from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights directly into the constitution. Once that was done, the constitution became "worth defending," as those I interviewed about this process back in the 1990s agreed. The deal was sealed by the creation of a Constitutional Court with the power to ensure that these rights would be enforced. The Constitutional Court then forged the path that the new governments traveled on their way to making Hungary a vibrant democracy for two decades.

Fast forward to 2022, the year that the parliamentary elections in Hungary saw the entire diverse opposition join forces to try to oust Prime Minister Viktor Orbán who was seeking a fourth consecutive term in government for his Fidesz party. Since coming to power in 2010, Orbán has captured virtually all independent political institutions in Hungary—first and foremost the Constitutional Court, which now acquiesces in autocracy. He rewrote the constitution and all of the key laws, including the election laws that guarantee his endless stay in power. Virtually all democracy raters—and the European Parliament—agree that Hungary is no longer a democracy. Given how the election rules were rigged by 2022, it was always a long shot to think that the opposition could win. But they needed a plan to govern in order to have a chance. As in 1989, unlikely



Court room of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France.

partners agreed that international law could unite them around common principles.

A team of lawyers, led by Zoltán Fleck, drafted an opposition plan to restore Hungarian democracy. The core of the plan involved bringing Hungary into compliance with European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In 1989, the country was on the outside looking into the EU and the Council of Europe. In 2022, it was inside and governed by the rules of those exclusive clubs. Enforcing these rules could undo much of Orbán's autocratic capture.

Orbán's Hungary is paralyzed by dozens of laws that require two-thirds parliamentary majorities to be changed, something that would hamstring the opposition even if it could win. But Hungary also ratified the EU treaties and the ECHR by earlier two-thirds majorities. Even Orbán's constitution says that international law trumps national statutes and therefore wins where the two conflict. So the opposition proposed to break out of Orbán's legal prison with an international law key forged by these prior parliamentary two-thirds majorities. Bringing Hungary back into compliance with its international obligations guided the choice of laws to reverse.

The problem in Hungary is in fact more complicated than this simple explanation suggests, but the general principle is clear. Once they finally come to power, committed democrats can use international law to guide them in repairing their damaged democracies.

International law resources have expanded since human rights law assisted many of the democratic political transitions of the 1980s and 1990s. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has become a legal giant, elaborating requirements for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and forming the core of national constitutional law across the 46 signatory states. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court of Human Rights have also become far more active. The EU has expanded its reach to ensure rights protection and to safeguard the independence of crucial institutions within member states. Election monitoring by international institutions now uses ever-deepening democratic standards for free and fair elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union have contributed human rights monitoring, election monitoring, and elaboration of basic democratic principles. In short, one does not have to look far in most regions of the world to find transnational law already in place that points the way to democratic restoration.

In the last two decades, international human rights courts have evolved from enforcing rights at the individual level to turning individual rights into structural guarantees at the state level. Take the right to a fair trial. Transnational courts used to focus on trial rights like the right to be heard and equality of arms be-

tween states and defendants; they now focus additionally on elaborating what it means for courts to be independent. In a series of recent blockbuster decisions, for example, the ECtHR has found that Poland has violated the individual right to a fair trial because the Constitutional Court and multiple chambers of the Supreme Court are full of judges who have been appointed in irregular ways that cast doubt on whether the courts are free of political tutelage. The IACtHR has defended independent judges in the name of fair trial rights against attempts by the political branches to remove them. The European Court of Justice, the highest court of the EU, has also developed detailed standards for judicial independence. Now, when new leaders of damaged democracies want to reverse autocratic capture, they can turn to these principles to put judiciaries back on an independent footing.

Ditto with election law. Not only has election monitoring become nearly universal since the last wave of transitions to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, but widely adopted principles for running free and fair elections now exist, developed most notably by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE. It even makes recommendations about how particular election systems can be improved. The jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts is starting to take these standards into account in interpreting the individual right to vote. The ACtHR, for example, recently found that an election commission with twice as many governing-par-

ty representatives as opposition-party representatives violated the individual right to vote of the citizens of Côte d'Ivoire, strongly suggesting that only equal representation would comply.

Committed democrats can use transnational standards like these to repair their country's domestic institutions. In fact, the standards derive their power from their transnational character. Precisely because they are transnational, they remain outside the reach of parties to a democratic transition and so cannot be gamed by those inside the process. Like the North Star used for navigation by sailors, international standards work to guide democratic transitions precisely because they do not shift when national governments change.

When new governments realign new laws with the legal North Star, they become immediately distinguishable from autocratic governments that worked to detach their regimes from this steadying influence. A new government that commits itself to complying with international law cannot be accused of a mere tit-for-tat against its predecessor or even of simply imposing a new partisan bias. Bringing damaged democracies back into compliance with international law principles restores the rule of law writ large. ◀

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Culture Wars Go Global

BY MILLA MINEVA

How do we globalize our conversations? Why is conservative discourse successfully appropriated in so different local contexts? Milla Mineva interprets the globalization/localization of culture wars as a specific form of identity politics, in which global fears are locally translated to produce social mobilizations that aim not at changing the social order but at policing the status quo.

In the early 1990s, James Davison Hunter used the term “culture wars” to describe the ideological polarization of American society. Today, culture wars are increasingly global, and the term no longer describes American specificity but the ideological polarization of the planet, marked by common ideas and fears. Culture wars are particularly interesting in the peripheries of the global world. Eastern Europe, for instance, is haunted by specters like the fear of gender ideology, political correctness, and cancel culture.

Conservative discourse spreads more successfully in the peripheries, where the critique of political correctness as a form of censorship prevails over the battle for a more inclusive language. Scarecrows like censorship, hypocrisy, and restriction of free speech float freely through the public spaces of Eastern Europe. They are introduced through various channels: conservative American vloggers, weaponized memes, Russian translations of conservative arguments, or fragments of Viktor Orbán’s speeches. It is the interplay of the different channels that amplifies the conservative discourse, turning it into common sense, a “natural attitude” that hides its conservative bias.

Nevertheless, conservative prejudice only takes root in localities where there are local actors—let us call them moral entrepreneurs—who can see their self-interest in the use of these discursive figures. Usually, the role of local actors who amplify conservative critiques, is played by local nationalists—that is, conservative “natives”—who simultaneously construct themselves as such through the imported discourse.

Why do nationalist parties need to localize global culture wars? Why do patriots need to fight foreign battles? The main battle, the local actors argue, is the one against the “liberal West” but, paradoxically enough, it is fought in the name of the true “Western civilization.”

Let us briefly tell this story in the voice of one such local actor from Bulgaria, Alexander Urumov, a civil servant and member of a nationalist party. According to him, a “behind-the-scenes elite in Brussels and Strasbourg” is trying to usurp the power of the old nation-states and it is Eastern Europe that can heroically oppose this “liberal elite” and defend “the interests of the family, traditional values, Christianity, and the nation.” In fact, Urumov argues, Western Europe is “in a helpless state,” “in a waking coma,” and this is precisely why the “common sense” of Eastern Europe can preserve the “natural order



At a “March for the Family,” in Sofia, Bulgaria, people protest against “gender ideology,” same-sex marriage, legal provisions of child and women protection that give the state the right to intervene in family matters, and everything they consider an attack on traditional Bulgarian family values (June 8, 2022).

of the world.”¹ Thus, Eastern Europe turns out to be not just different but also more valuable because it is called to become the guardian of the true nature of the “Western civilization.”

In fact, local entrepreneurs weaponize the old dividing line between East and West (here, more precisely between Eastern and Western Europe) while shifting positions of symbolic power. In his famous work *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Larry Wolf points out the history of how the region has been seen as an area in need of civilization and as an experimental field for the political ideas of the Enlightenment. The new conservative entrepreneurs reverse both arguments. First, it is the West that is going through experiments today, leading it away from its true nature. Second, it is the East that is going to export back the true civilization to the West, and the East will become the guardian of the true Western, Christian civilization.

Through the translation of the culture wars local, actor-entrepreneurs are able to construct a new local identity that is visible on the global stage and thus fight for recognition. “Traditional,” “family,” and “Christian” values become global empty markers into which identity circles can be inscribed without tension. In short, culture wars in the periphery are used as tools in identity politics oriented toward the reworking of “national” identity in global contexts.

There is one important twist here. When we talk about identity politics, we imagine claims for recognition by marginalized social groups. This provokes the indignation of conservatives, who tend to invert the demand for equal recognition into a demand for privileges. Thus, local conservative entrepreneurs delegitimize the demands of socially marginalized groups but simultaneously in the global context they construct the “conservative people” as a group marginalized and threatened by liberal elites, making claims for its equal recognition as the savior of “true Christian civilization.” Identity politics, according to them, should be abolished within the nation-state but fought relentlessly at the global level.

Why do conservative entrepreneurs need to mobilize social groups through fear about the loss of supposed traditional values? In *The Phantom Terror*, Adam Zamoyski shows how the history of Europe after the French Revolution was dominated by the fear of conservative elites that revolution might break out again.² This fear produced narratives of conspiracies, stories that secret forces threatened not just the social and political order but also “the moral fabric on which that order rested” (p. 13). This imaginary fear was in fact maintained by governments and acted in their interest, leading to “restrictions on the freedom of the individual by measures

meant to protect him from the supposed threat” (p. 14).

Are culture wars today producing new imaginary fears in order to once again maintain social order in an age of crises? Let us hear now another conservative voice: Kuzman Iliev, a Bulgarian economist and parliamentary candidate for a patriotic party. In his critique of political correctness, he shares his fears that it is “raging all around the world” and that the left “is gaining momentum and preparing for a powerful attack,” expressed in “a widespread struggle against inequalities.” He goes on to say: “For the right, inequalities are natural and useful, they even are the basis of civilization and progress.... Economic interventionism, unfair redistribution, cultural victimization.... all these corrupt social attitudes. So dangerous is the leftist worldview that, if it becomes deep-rooted in culture and economics, the threat literally concerns the future of civilization as we know it.” Against this dangerous left attitudes, a new right-wing populism has to be invented: “a message, close to the people, simple, and as inclusive as possible. Everyone loves their home and their families and wants to protect their own property. Culturally conservative—preserving and conserving—is the most bounded yet most progressive credo—to prosper, you must have a solid foundation to build on.”³

We can see here an attempt to retell the neoconservative consensus in a cultural key. In such discourses in the peripheries, the economic selfishness, the denial of redistribution, and the social inequalities are all presented as “natural” traditional values and even the foundations of Western civilization. In times of crises, cultural and political mobilizations are constructed as moral panics, and economic consensus are protected and safeguarded as “natural.”

Global audiences discuss similar subjects in completely different contexts. What we see through the interpretation of the Eastern European case is the shifting of the debate in a right-wing, conservative direction—right-wing interpretations being the narratives through which particular crises are thought and told. And, paradoxically, the globalization of discourse occurs through the local enactment of panic-oriented plots to consolidate the social order. ◀

1) Alexander Urumov, “The War against the Family,” *Trud*, January 3, 2021.
2) Adam Zamoyski, *The Phantom Terror*, Basic Books, 2015.
3) Kuzman Iliev, “The Strategy for the Right,” Annual 2020 of the magazine *Conservative*, 2021.

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The U.S. Funding Behind the Anti-Gender Movements in Europe

BY TATEV HOVHANNISYAN

Over the past twenty years, transnational movements against women's rights and gender equality have grown in strength across Europe. Investigations by openDemocracy show that this backlash is well-organized and extensively funded by transnational actors, especially from the United States.*

Since 2017, the Tracking the Backlash team of feminist investigative journalists at openDemocracy—has undertaken several investigations into the global movement against women's rights and gender equality, revealing new evidence about how foreign “dark money” is spent around the world and the tactics that are used. This shows that the backlash in Europe is extensively funded by transnational actors, notably U.S. Christian conservatives. This is not an uncoordinated phenomenon. Anti-rights groups have organized networks, carefully planned strategies, large funds, and ambitious goals to block or roll back rights by exerting influence on elections, courts, education and health systems, policymakers, and the public.

In 2017, openDemocracy created the largest dataset of how U.S. Christian right-wing groups that oppose sexual and reproductive rights spend their money in Europe. These groups are quite open about their goal to abolish universal human rights. They explicitly state their opposition to LGBTIQ rights, including same-sex marriage, and that “conversion therapy” should not be banned.

Many of these groups are linked to former U.S. president Donald Trump and his close circle. Several are also connected to the World Congress of Families, a global network of ultra-conservative activists and organizations with links to far-right politicians and movements in a number of European countries, including Hungary, Italy, Poland, Serbia, and Spain. The key organizations are the Alliance Defending Freedom, the American Center for Law and Justice, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, Family Watch International, Focus on the Family, Human Rights International, Human Life International, and the Leadership Institute.

Hundreds of pages of financial data from such U.S. anti-rights groups show that most of their spending was in Europe. Between 2007 and 2019, they spent more than \$98 million there, mainly on campaigns against women's and LGBTIQ rights, sex education, and abortion. However, this amount does not reflect the full level of spending by such groups because



Photo: Mousas817 / iStockphoto.com

some are registered as churches in the United States and therefore are under no obligation to disclose their financial data.

Top Spenders and their Strategies

The global arm of Alliance Defending Freedom, ADF International, is involved in dozens of court cases around the world against reproductive rights and marriage equality. The group opened its London office in 2017 and has invested hundreds of thousands of pounds on lobbying in the United Kingdom.

Likewise, the European offices of the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) have presented amicus briefs in numerous court cases against sexual and reproductive rights. When Poland's constitutional court voted to ban abortion in cases of fetal defects in 2020, the ACLJ had submitted arguments in favor of the new restrictions, which were condemned by the Council of Europe as a grave “human rights violation.”

The Billy Graham Evangelistic Association is well known for its anti-abortion stance and is a major international spender, disbursing \$96 million between 2007 and 2014, according to its financial filings. It has not had to disclose its foreign spending since changing its reg-

istration in the United States from that of a nonprofit organization to that of a church in 2014. In 2020, it sued numerous U.K. venues and city councils that had cancelled its events because of homophobic and Islamophobic comments made by its president, Franklin Graham.

openDemocracy has identified a wide range of strategies these organizations use. They target women with misinformation about their health and rights; they send teams of lobbyists to Brussels to influence EU officials; they support campaigns against LGBTIQ rights; they fund a network of “grassroots” anti-abortion campaigns; and they host major meetings in Europe, attended by hundreds of religious-right activists and far-right politicians.

New Revelations

These groups do not reveal the sources of their funding, but openDemocracy has revealed that two U.S. charities—the National Christian Foundation (NCF) and Fidelity Charitable—gave them \$93 million between 2016 and 2020, placing them among their top funders. The bulk of this money, \$85 million, has come from the NCF, which is a far-right evangelical charity. The main recipient at \$48.9 million was the ADF, with the NCF account-

ing for 73 percent of all the grants it received. The NCF also provided 54 percent of the grants received by Focus on the Family (\$23 million), 25 percent of those received by the Family Research Council (\$10.6 million), and smaller amounts to other organizations.

The NCF is a donor-advised fund that allows givers to choose which organizations receive grants and also to remain anonymous. It is considered “the single biggest source of money [for] pro-life and anti-LGBT movements over the past 15 years.”¹ The NCF has also reportedly given money to groups involved in anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant activities. In a written response to openDemocracy, it stated: “NCF does not develop or implement strategies about which charities or causes to support. All grants are initiated by the recommendations of our givers.”

Fidelity Charitable, which is the philanthropic arm of the financial giant Fidelity Investments and was the largest U.S. charity in terms of fundraising revenue in 2016, gives out hundreds of small grants. Since 2016, it has given \$7.9 million to several of these conservative organizations, most of it to Focus on the Family (\$3 million) and the ADF (\$2 million) via 831 and 407 different grants respectively. Fidelity Charitable has been criticized for helping

donors to fund several far-right platforms. These include the New Century Foundation, a white-supremacy group that fabricated the claim that Black people are more prone to violent crime than white people, and the VDARE Foundation, whose leader has said that “Hispanics do specialize in rape, particularly of children.”² Responding to openDemocracy, Fidelity Charitable stated that it is “a cause-neutral public charity [...] completely independent of Fidelity Investments, and its grants do not reflect the views of, or represent an endorsement by, Fidelity Charitable or Fidelity Investments.”

What Comes Next?

The data collected and the analysis by openDemocracy show that anti-gender movements are interested in long-term wins. Ultra-conservatives focus their efforts on Europe and the infrastructure they have built up is not going to disappear. According to Neil Datta, the secretary of the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights, our findings “further demonstrate the growing trend of religious extremists forging cross-border alliances to advance ... pseudo-legal arguments and engaging in formal legal processes aiming to unstitch the fabric of human rights protection.”³

For Sophie in 't Veld, a member of the European Parliament, “Europeans are too naive in thinking that achievements in women's rights and sexual and reproductive health are irreversible. The anti-choice movement does not only have a lot of money, they also have a plan and the determination.” As she concludes, “Europe should wake up, and it should wake up fast.”⁴

¹) openDemocracy is an independent international media platform, headquartered in London. It produces high-quality journalism that challenges power, inspires change, and builds leadership among groups underrepresented in the media.

²) www.ajc.com/neighborhoods/alpharetta/alpharetta-home-to-massive-mysterious-charity/RX7MWY6OKJHXJG2AEZJDFGFRE/

³) www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/peter-brimelow
⁴) Communication with openDemocracy.

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Der westdeutsche Dschihad gegen den Kommunismus

VON BEHLÜL ÖZKAN

Deutschland gehört zu den Ländern, die das Wachstum des Islamismus in ihrem Territorium am meisten beklagen. Behlül Özkan zeigt, warum diese Lage in hohem Maße ein hausgemachtes Problem ist.

In den letzten Jahren beschwerten sich deutsche Behörden zunehmend über die Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (DITIB), die fast 900 Moscheen und Vereine in Deutschland kontrolliert und Hunderte von Imamen beschäftigt. Vor dem Hintergrund von Ermittlungen zu „Spionage“-Vorwürfen gegen DITIB-Imame behauptete der Präsident des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz im Jahre 2017, es habe „eine dramatische Zunahme der nachrichtendienstlichen Aktivitäten der Türkei in Deutschland“ gegeben. Die Tatsache, dass Gehälter von Imamen und Mitarbeitern der DITIB, die als Zweigstelle des Präsidiums für religiöse Angelegenheiten in der Türkei fungiert, aus der Türkei überwiesen werden, und dass es den deutschen Staat nicht stört, dass eine religiöse Behörde eines anderen Landes seit Jahren innerhalb seiner Grenzen tätig ist, diese aber von Zeit zu Zeit der „Spionage“ beschuldigt, ist ein seltener Fall in den internationalen Beziehungen. Weniger bekannt ist, dass die Gründung der DITIB der antikommunistischen Politik der Bundesrepublik während des Kalten Krieges maßgeblich geschuldet ist.

Bald nach Beginn der Migration türkischer Arbeitnehmer:innen in die Bundesrepublik im Jahr 1961 warnten türkische Diplomaten in Bonn vor „kommunistischen Rundfunksendungen“. Der Hintergrund: Die Führung der in der Türkei illegalen Kommunistischen Partei (TKP) war in der zweiten Hälfte der 1950er Jahre in die DDR gezogen. Die Ausstrahlung der türkischen Radiosendungen der TKP wurde mit der Ankunft türkischer Arbeiter:innen auf die Bundesrepublik ausgedehnt. Die Tatsache, dass türkische Industriearbeiter:innen in das Visier des Kommunismus gerieten, sobald sie einen Fuß in die Bundesrepublik setzten, weckte die Ängste Ankaras und Bonns. 1963 forderte Arbeitsminister Bülent Ecevit bei einem Besuch in der Bundesrepublik Bonn auf, als Antwort auf die türkischen Rundfunksendungen aus der DDR türkische Zeitungen herauszugeben und Radiosendungen auszustrahlen. Bonn reagierte damals nicht wohlwollend auf die Forderungen der Türkei. Man stellte keine Notwendigkeit zum Handeln fest, war doch die Zahl der türkischen Arbeiter:innen immer noch auf einige Tausende begrenzt.

Als die Arbeitsmigration aus der Türkei ab Mitte der 1960er Jahre rapide zunahm, war auch die türkische



Der Leiter des Landesamtes für Verfassungsschutz Hamburg steht vor Plakaten mit der Aufschrift „Islamismus“ und „Linksextremismus“ nach einer Pressekonferenz zur Vorstellung des neuen Verfassungsschutzberichts, 4. Juli 2022.

Arbeiterklasse in der Bundesrepublik von den linken Bewegungen betroffen, die 1968 die Welt erfassten. Zudem hatte sich die TKP mit Sitz in Leipzig begonnen, mit Gewerkschaften, Streiks und Demonstrationen auf sich aufmerksam zu machen. Im antikommunistischen Klima des Kalten Krieges wertete Bonn den Einfluss der TKP auf die türkische Arbeiterklasse der Bundesrepublik als Bedrohung und beschloss, als Gegenmittel dem politischen Islam den Weg zu ebnet.

Die Mehrheit der heute in Europa lebenden Türk:innen ist sehr religiös und hat eine konservative Weltanschauung. Bei den türkischen Wahlen stimmen mehr als 60 Prozent für die islamistische AKP. In den 1960er Jahren waren die Türken in Europa jedoch nicht so. Memoiren türkischer Gastarbeiter aus dieser Zeit ist zu entnehmen, dass eine erhebliche Anzahl von ihnen eine linke Weltanschauung hatte und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben in Deutschland offen gegenüberstand. Die türkische Arbeiterklasse in Deutschland sollte jedoch im Rahmen eines „Dschihad“ gegen den Kommunismus mit der aktiven Unterstützung der deutschen Regierungen islamisiert werden.

Einer der wichtigsten Akteure der Islamisierung in der Bundesrepublik war die Muslimbruderschaft. Im Zuge der nationalistischen Machtübernahme in Ägypten und Syrien flohen einige Mitglieder der Muslimbruderschaft seit den späten 1950er

Jahren in die Bundesrepublik. Während die ägyptische Muslimbruderschaft München als ihren Hauptsitz wählte, ließ sich die syrische Muslimbruderschaft in Aachen nieder. Bonn hielt die Muslimbruderschaft für einen Trumpf gegen die Annäherung der DDR an Nassers Ägypten und das syrische Baath-Regime. Der politische Islam sollte nicht nur zugunsten der Bonner Nahostpolitik, sondern auch für innenpolitische Interessen eingesetzt werden. Die Verbindungen zwischen den Islamisten der Türkei unter Erbakans Führung und den Muslimbrüdern aus dem Nahen Osten wurden durch die Bundesrepublik gefördert. Die Moscheen und Vereine, die in der Bundesrepublik rasch eröffnet wurden, gerieten unter die Kontrolle der islamischen Gemeinden und der Muslimbruderschaft in der Türkei. Auf diese Weise wurde die türkische Arbeiterklasse ab den späten 1960er Jahren rasch islamisiert. Das ging so weit, dass in den 1970er Jahren Demonstrationen türkischer linker Organisationen in West-Berlin, darunter der TKP, von türkischen islamistischen Organisationen bekämpft wurden. Die deutsche Polizei ermutigte und unterstützte die türkischen Islamisten in ihrem Kampf gegen die Linke.

Es entbehrt nicht einer gewissen Ironie, dass das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, das in den 2010er Jahren feststellen musste, dass türkische Imame unter der Kontrolle von MIT stünden, in den 1970er

Jahren das unglaubliche Wachstum der türkischen islamistischen Organisationen komplett „übersehen“ hatte, während es die Formationen der türkischen Linken genau beobachtete und als Bedrohung einstufte.

Im Jahr 1979 hatten drei Entwicklungen im Nahen Osten einen erheblichen Einfluss auf die Radikalisierung türkischer Islamisten in der Bundesrepublik. Das waren 1) die sowjetische Invasion in Afghanistan und der dort begonnene Dschihad; 2) der Aufstand der syrischen Muslimbruderschaft gegen das Assad-Regime; und 3) die islamische Revolution im Iran. Im Zuge der Radikalisierung der islamistischen Gruppen in der Bundesrepublik riefen einige ein Kalifat aus, während andere für eine Ausweitung des Dschihad eintraten. Als Bonn die Gefahr einer Radikalisierung erkannte, klopfte es an die Tür des Militärregimes, das 1980 durch einen Staatsstreich in der Türkei an die Macht gekommen war.

Am 18. Juli 1983 landete das Flugzeug des deutschen Innenministers Friedrich Zimmermann, eines der berühmtesten Antikommunisten des Kalten Krieges, in Ankara. In den 1970er Jahren hatten Franz-Josef Strauß und die CSU Kontakte zum Führer der türkischen extremen Rechten, Türkeş, und seiner Partei MHP geknüpft und deren Kampf gegen die türkische Linke in der Bundesrepublik unterstützt. Zimmermann erklärte der türkischen Seite, dass islamistische Or-

ganisationen in Deutschland sich zunehmend radikalisierten und außer Kontrolle geraten seien. Das Militärregime und der deutsche Innenminister einigten sich darauf, eine Zweigstelle der Diyanet, der staatlichen Behörde religiöser Angelegenheiten, in Deutschland zu eröffnen: DITIB. DITIB würde Moscheen, die von radikalisierten islamistischen Gemeinden und Organisationen beherrscht wurden, unter die Kontrolle des türkischen Staates stellen. Ähnlich sollten die Abgaben der türkischen Arbeitnehmer:innen für die islamische Solidarität der DITIB, d.h. Ankara, zugeführt werden. Diese Lösung war im Sinne der türkischen Generäle, die die türkisch-islamische Synthese als offizielle Ideologie übernommen hatten.

Daraufhin nahmen die Aktivitäten der DITIB in der Bundesrepublik rasch zu. Bald übernahm sie die Kontrolle einer beträchtlichen Anzahl von Moscheen. Infolge von Gerichtsverfahren gegen die Führer von islamistischen Gemeinschaften und Organisationen in Deutschland wurden prominente Persönlichkeiten bei ihrer Ankunft in der Türkei verhaftet. Sowohl Bonn als auch Ankara waren mit der DITIB zufrieden. Bis die AKP im Jahr 2002 an die Macht kam...

Nach der Machtübernahme der AKP wurden fast alle staatlichen Institutionen in Apparate des Einparteiensystems umgewandelt. Erdoğan nutzte die in Europa lebenden Türken als Trumpfkarte in seinen Verhandlungen mit den europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs, und DITIB hat sich zu einem der effektivsten Instrumente entwickelt, um Türken in Europa zu erreichen.

Deutschland beklagt heute diese Situation. Doch es war Deutschland, das zunächst den islamistischen Gemeinschaften und Organisationen den Weg im Kampf gegen die Linke geebnet hatte. Dann klopfte es bei Ankara für die Einrichtung der DITIB an, um sie zu kontrollieren. Nach 2002 begann Deutschland sich darüber zu beschweren, dass die DITIB seine Interessen bedroht. Wie ein türkisches Sprichwort sagt: *Kendim ettim, kendim buldum* – „wenn man einen Fehler macht, muss man sich den Folgen stellen.“ ◀

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National Minorities and the Appeal of Non-Territoriality


BY MARINA GERMANE

Popular at the turn of the twentieth century, the Austro-Marxist idea of non-territorial autonomy for national minorities was relegated to a dusty corner of history for decades after World War Two. Lately, it has been experiencing a revival.

“The idea of non-territorial national autonomy, despite being widely recognized theoretically, is not acceptable in practice to those who are not used to it,” wrote Max Laserson in a Latvian newspaper in 1922.¹ A century later, the sentiment expressed by the Latvian-Jewish parliamentarian, who was a staunch proponent of the idea, still rings true. Despite a steadily growing body of literature on non-territorial autonomy (NTA) from the end of the nineteenth century to the present, it is still often perceived by the wider public as a mothballed intellectual curiosity rather than a blueprint for solving the dilemma of ethnic diversity in a world of nation-states.

The idea of NTA, which attempts to separate the notions of nation and territory by granting self-governance in cultural and educational matters to national groups regardless of their territorial settlement, has many ideological antecedents. It was most comprehensively articulated in the works of the Austrian social democrat Karl Renner (1870–1950) at the turn of the twentieth century. His *Staat und Nation* (1899) and *Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen* (1902) were widely read in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond, circulated primarily through socialist channels. Seemingly holding the promise of solving the nationalities question while sparing territorial borders, NTA quickly became, as the historian Gerald Stourzh put it, “tantamount to a magic word.” Numerous political parties in the multinational Habsburg and Russian Empires made national autonomy, in its territorial or non-territorial form (or, often, in a combination of the two), part of their programmes and manifestos, while many nascent national movements claimed it as their sole *raison d'être*. The advocacy for NTA was particularly strong on the part of Eastern European Jewish minorities, with the Russian Jewish historian Simon Dubnow (1860–1941) coming up with his own theory of Jewish autonomism.

As debates on the future of Central and Eastern Europe intensified during World War One, the idea of national collectives as legal entities with autonomous agency in cultural affairs was seemingly only gaining strength. After the February Revolu-



The idea of NTA was most comprehensively articulated in the works of Karl Renner at the turn of the twentieth century, in particular in *Der Kampf der Österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (1902), published under the pen name Rudolf Springer. It was widely read in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond, circulated primarily through socialist channels.

tion of 1917, the federalist projects of all liberal and socialist parties within Russia included autonomy in one way or another. The Bolsheviks, who came to power in November 1917, famously rejected NTA outright—however, in practice their territorial approach to the nationalities question was often complemented by non-territorial arrangements.

Minority rights came sharply into focus once a wave of pogroms broke out across Central and Eastern Europe at the close of the war, making everybody wonder whether the newly minted nation-states could rival the late Russian Empire in its proverbial antisemitism, and whether additional safeguards were required for minorities. In 1918, on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference, Renner published *Das Selbst-*

bestimmungsrecht der Nationen, an expanded and updated edition of his 1902 book. Renner's theory was vividly discussed in Paris behind the scenes by those who were tasked with solving the nationalities question and those who strove to advise them. However, the perceived “Germanic” origins of the idea of NTA caused certain misgivings early on. These suspicions were later aggravated by the fact that, throughout the interwar period, in Central and Eastern Europe NTA was championed by the German minorities, along with the Jews. In the words of the historian Mark Mazower, these “two great minorities of 1918” spearheaded the struggle for minority rights between the world wars, often joining forces domestically and internationally.

The contribution of the Jewish lobbying delegations at the Paris Peace Conference to the formulation of minority rights in the subsequent Minority Treaties that were placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, thus creating the first-ever international regime of minority rights, is widely recognized by historians.² But when it came to the issue of national autonomy for minorities, these delegations were deeply divided. While the Eastern European Jews advocated for autonomy and the Americans, especially the newly created American Jewish Congress, supported them in their demands, the French and British Jews insisted that Eastern European ones should, like them, strive only to become equal citizens of their respective states. Eventually, a compromise was reached, and the Jewish memoranda submitted to the peacemakers asked not just for minorities' equal civil and political rights and non-discrimination on the grounds of race or religion, but also for the autonomous management of their religious, educational, charitable, and other cultural organizations. In the end, the words “autonomy” or “autonomous” did not make it into the treaties. However, the stipulations on minority schooling, albeit couched in different terms, came quite close to the Jewish demands. But, importantly, these rights were extended to individuals belonging to national minorities but not to the national collectives.

Nevertheless, a number of new nation-states promised NTA to their minorities in their independence proclamations. During the interwar period, it was implemented in the short-lived Ukrainian People's Republic (1918–1921), the revolutionary Upper Volga Region, Siberia, and the Far Eastern Republic. NTA flourished in democratic Lithuania from 1919 to 1922. In Latvia, the de facto NTA provisions for minorities were in place from 1919 until 1934. In the most celebrated case, a fully-fledged NTA for minorities was realized in Estonia from 1925 to 1940. On the international scene, the Congress of European Nationalities (1925–1938), a common body of minorities that in its heyday represented twenty ethnic minority groups from fifteen states, made NTA a cornerstone of its programme. In 1929, emboldened by the

success of NTA in Estonia, it called—unsuccessfully—on the League of Nations to replace the existing Minority Treaties with “a genuinely pan-European guarantee of minority rights” based on the NTA model.

It was perhaps the infamous demise of the Congress of European Nationalities, which in the late 1930s became subverted by the Nazis, and of the League of Nations, together with the minority rights regime it underpinned and the entire international order it represented, that relegated NTA to a dusty corner of history. After World War Two, the focus shifted decisively toward individual human rights and away from minority rights. Until very recently NTA remained a largely forgotten, antiquated notion.

But with the collapse of the socialist bloc in Europe in the late 1980s, new national minorities emerged, and old and new methods alike were required in order to deal with the newly salient ethnic diversity. Since then, interest in NTA has been steadily growing among academics and practitioners. Elements of it, in different forms and guises, are present in various diversity-accommodation mechanisms around the world, and they can also be found in minority-protection legal mechanisms. As a group-rights-based approach to diversity, NTA has assumed a prominent place in the debates between individualists and communitarians, highlighting the drawbacks and the advantages of the model in a world of nation-states. Contrary to earlier assumptions, the jury is still out when it comes to the future prospects for NTA. <

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1) Max Laserson, “Blagonadezhna li natsional'naia avtonomia” [Is National Autonomy Trustworthy?], *Segodnya*, 8 March 1922: 1.

2) See, for example, Mark Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–19*. (London, The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization: 1992) and Carole Fink, *Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878–1938*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2004).

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Inventing Youth Politics in the 1820s and the 2020s

BY OREL BEILINSON

In the 2020s, youth politics seems to be awakening globally. In Southeast Asia, millennials-based parties like the Future Forward Party in Thailand entered parliament. But in Israel, a new party “for youth by youth” failed to achieve a breakthrough in the most recent elections. Orel Beilinson returns to the origin of youth politics in 1820s Europe to show its resemblance with today’s iterations—and how they crucially differ.

One Friday in March, I was sitting at a café in Tel Aviv when a spontaneous demonstration formed in a nearby junction. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had fired his minister of defense a few minutes earlier. As the crowds grew from dozens to thousands, a friend called. “You are an expert on youth politics,” he said. “Where are the youth? Why is the National Union of Israeli Students not striking?” A month earlier, when I was in Graz for an archival research trip, a colleague handed me her phone. On the screen was a Facebook post by the Freedom Party of Austria’s youth wing in Carinthia calling to “halt Carinthia’s Slovenization.” And earlier, in September 2022, as I arrived at IWM, the talk in Israel, often mocking, was about Hadar Muchtar, the 21-year-old founder of a new party called Youths on Fire. Its website states that “Only the youth will care for the youth.”

Each of these anecdotes speaks to a different form of youthful participation in politics. Austria’s Slovenophobes are their party’s disciples. Its youth wing targets children as young as ten and adults as old as thirty, politicizing the former and offering political careers to the latter. The National Union of Israeli Students is also a petri dish for politicians. Its former leaders frequently align with a party and run for parliament. The union is their training ground: it is where they practice mobilizing voters, representing constituents, and serving as elected bureaucrats. But neither party youth wings nor student unions threaten adult politics. The former are ruled by parties, while the latter remain confined to university politics. In Israel, the union is only expected to intervene in national politics if student interests are jeopardized; its strikes were mostly limited to tuition fees.

Youth parties like Hadar Muchtar’s are rare. Another prominent example is the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance. The youth-centric party was founded in 2020 by Syed Saddiq, who had founded the Malaysian United Indigenous Party’s youth wing in 2016 and became a member of parliament and minister of youth in 2018.

Muchtar and Saddiq have attacked the political sphere as geriatric and lethargic. “We want to unshackle Malaysia from the type of politics based on money and power and refresh it with young people



Israeli social media star and leader of the Youth on Fire movement Hadar Muchtar, meets people at the Mahane Yehuda Market in Jerusalem in the course of her campaign for the September 2022 parliamentary elections.

with the right heart, mind, and interests,” Saddiq has said. Muchtar said she wanted to replace “members of parliament who sat here for twenty years and did nothing” and who “burned down our future.” Her intended “revolution” more than threatened adult politics—it sought to upend it.

Harnessing Youth

Two centuries ago, the flame of youth power was kindled in Europe. Adam Mickiewicz, later regarded as Poland’s national bard, wrote an “Ode to Youth” at the University of Vilnius. The poem was ecstatically vague. It endowed youth with the power and responsibility to change the world. It did not yet matter who counted as youth and what this youth was to change. Mickiewicz’s secret student society was outlawed and disbanded, but the ode was copied and reprinted. In 1830, when Polish cadets rose against the Russian Empire, its words appeared on walls throughout Warsaw.

That same year, in Italy, Giuseppe Mazzini grew disillusioned with his secret society. He was twenty-five, not much younger than Mickiewicz. The *carbonari*, whom he had joined hoping to free Italy from foreign rule, relied too much on France for his liking. His rupture with the *carbonari*’s leadership was, to him, generational. They were “men of the past,” while he represented “Young Italy.” They were not corrupt or idle, as Muchtar and Saddiq accuse poli-

ticians today. Their generation had brought about the French Revolution, after all. But it had since fallen “back into the mud from which it had wanted to rise.”

Mixing Mazzini’s agenda with Mickiewicz’s enthusiasm created a powerful tool for youth mobilization. Romantic poets, like Sándor Petőfi in Hungary and Johan Nybom in Sweden around 1848, kept writing similar hymns to the “Ode to Youth.” New young political activists kept dissenting from their parties. Denouncing the elite’s senescence allowed them to tie age and politics. They painted their programs as naturally deriving from birth cohorts and generational experiences.

For Mazzini, this formative experience was the French Revolution and Napoleonic rule. Muchtar points to the growing difficulties of Israel’s young adults in purchasing an apartment. The answer, she claims, is free-market liberalism. While this ideology is ordinarily associated with the political right, Youths on Fire’s platform states: “We do not believe in right and left” and “This is the ruling elite’s brainwash.”

The Problem of Generations

Here lies a significant difference between the 1820s and the 2020s. Muchtar’s adoption of economic liberalism differs from the nineteenth-century adoption of liberal nationalism. For Mazzini, Mickiewicz, and their successors, youth was a mighty stratum of a larger collective. They

mobilized youth to redeem Italy and Poland. Muchtar asks youth to save themselves, and first she tried to convince young voters that they had joint problems. For her, this is not an energetic population to galvanize but rather an interest group. Her party sets out “to make the State of Israel good to youth.”

Such rhetoric has taken hold in other countries too. Adolescents marched in the streets of London holding signs that read: “I am thirteen, and Brexit steals my future.” This is also a common phrasing in youth climate protests, a movement ignited by the teenager Greta Thunberg. Pupils skip school to march, rally, strike, and fight for collectives like “the earth” but also for themselves. They fight for a cause they believe to be particular to them, as a generation, as young people.

Observers explain youths’ “eco-anxiety” and even their supposed “antiwork mentality” as products of a generational feeling that the world is crumbling. This feeling is exclusionary. While Mazzini disagreed with the *carbonari*, he envisioned an Italy free and democratic for all. He shared their problem. The radical version of the Gen-Z credo yields a sharper antagonism: the older generations partied at our expense.

No Pedocracy for Israel

Around 1900, some feared that the youths would overthrow the adults, their flames consuming Europe. Some warned of “pedocracy.”

But this did not happen. In the two centuries since Mickiewicz and Mazzini, older people learned how to play safely with youthful fire. Politicians learned to harness its energy without being consumed by its radical flames.

As Sarah Pickard concluded about contemporary Britain, youth wings “tend to be sidelined and distanced by parent parties, but at the same time are expected to tow the party line.”¹ Very few Austrians took the Freedom Party’s youth too seriously. The Constitutional Court of Thailand took the Future Forward Party very seriously and disbanded it after it received 17 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections.

In Israel, anxieties about real-estate prices won Youths on Fire 0.18 percent of the vote in the last elections—a clear failure for a party that promised that only youth could save youth in the era of youth. Perhaps Israel is not a good country for free-market enthusiasts (the Economic Freedom party, which has a similar ideology, got 0.33 percent). Perhaps Israel is not a good country for youthful fire. The last statement would have made more sense before the events of March, though. In the protests where my friends failed to see students, many chanted “you messed with the wrong generation.”

Generational flames kindle spontaneously. Although marketers, sociologists, and others monitor generations closely and continuously, such flames are hard to predict and control. To rekindle the extinguishing fire in Israel, Muchtar may want to study the original spark that ignited it in the 1820s. Mickiewicz, Mazzini, and their contemporaries mobilized and institutionalized youth. Their success made modern European politics. ◀


¹ Sarah Pickard, *Politics, Protest and Young People* (London, 2019), p. 225.

Orel Beilinson is a historian of Eurasia. He is currently completing his PhD at the Yale University. He was a guest of the IWM in 2022–2023.

Publikation des IWM

Edward Ashford Lee
Co-Evolution: Die Symbiose von Mensch und Maschine

Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2023, 104 S., Übersetzung von Andreas Wirthensohn, ISBN-13: 9783991360278 (erscheint im Oktober)



Die rasante Entwicklung der Künstlichen Intelligenz wirft fundamentale Fragen für unsere Zukunft als Menschen auf. Edward A. Lee widerspricht der frommen Erwartung, dass die neue technologische Entwicklung planbar und kontrollierbar bleiben kann. Zugleich distanziert er sich von apokalyptischen Szenarien, die in der KI nur eine Bedrohung und das Ende der Menschheit sehen wollen. Er beschreibt das zukünftige Verhältnis von Menschen und Maschinen eher als „Ko-Evolution“ und „Symbiose“. Menschheit und neue Technologie werden in wechselseitiger

Abhängigkeit zusammenwachsen, so dass sie in Zukunft nicht mehr unabhängig existieren können. Das birgt große Risiken, die jedoch als Pathologien einer Symbiose und nicht als existentielle Gefahr für die Menschheit behandelt werden sollten. Die größte Bedrohung für die Menschheit besteht nicht darin, dass Maschinen uns überflüssig machen, sondern dass sie das Wesen unseres Seins – das, was es bedeutet, ein Mensch zu sein – grundlegend verändern werden.

Das Buch von Edward Ashford Lee erscheint im Rahmen des Programms *Digitaler Humanismus* am Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, und ist das erste Projekt einer neuen Kooperation zwischen dem IWM mit dem Mandelbaum Verlag.

Edward Ashford Lee ist Computerwissenschaftler und Robert S. Pepper Distinguished Professor Emeritus an der University of California, Berkeley. Seit mehr als 40 Jahren arbeitet Lee sehr erfolgreich in der Entwicklung von Cyber-Physikalischen Systemen (CPS) und Embedded Systems, der Einbindung von Computern in technische Prozesse. Weithin bekannt geworden ist er durch seine Bücher *Plato and the Nerd: The Creative Partnership of Humans and Technology* (2017) und *The Coevolution: The Entwined Futures of Humans and Machines* (2020). Lee ist Mitinitiator und Erstunterzeichner des Wiener Manifests für Digitalen Humanismus; 2022 war er im Rahmen des *Digital Humanism*-Programms in Kooperation mit der TU Wien Fellow des IWM.

Publications by Fellows

Randall Hansen
War, Work, and Want: How the OPEC Oil Crisis Caused Mass Migration and Revolution
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, 336 pp., ISBN-13: 9780197657690



An expansive history of how an economic shock a half century ago created a world that is addicted to mass migration.

The oil shock of 1973 changed everything. It

brought the golden age of American and European economic growth to an end; it destabilized Middle Eastern politics; and it set in train processes that led to over one hundred million unexpected—and unwanted—immigrants.

In *War, Work, and Want*, Randall Hansen asks why, against all expectations, global migration tripled after 1970. The answer, he argues, lies in how the OPEC Oil crisis transformed the global economy, Middle Eastern geopolitics and, as a consequence, international migration. The quadrupling of oil prices and attendant inflation destroyed economic growth in the West while flooding the Middle East with oil money. American and European consumers, their wealth drained, rebuilt their standard of living on the back of cheap labor—and cheap migrants. The Middle East enjoyed the benefits of a historic wealth transfer, but oil became a poisoned chalice leading to political instability, revolution, and war, all of which resulted in tens of millions of refugees. The economic, and migratory, conse-

quences of the OPEC oil crisis transformed the contours of domestic politics around the world. They fueled the growth of nationalist-populist parties that built their brands on blaming immigrants for collapsing standards of living, willfully ignoring the fact that mass immigration was the effect, not the cause, of that collapse.

In showing how war (the main driver of refugee flows), work (labor migrants), and want (the desire for ever cheaper products made by migrants) led to the massive upsurge in global migration after 1973, this book will reshape our understanding of the past half-century of global history.

Ranabir Samaddar
Imprints of the Populist Time
Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan, 2023, 352 pp., ISBN-13: 9789354422584



The crisis of liberal democracy in the neoliberal world—marked by massive labour flows, migrations, and informal conditions of work—has led to the emergence of new forms of claim-

making and a new sense of rights even as governments try to garner popular support and legitimacy through strategies termed as 'populist' gestures. Today, populism is integral to the daily discourse of politics and discussions of democracy, governance, and people. *Imprints of the Populist Time* investigates populism as a historical phenomenon, examining its dynamic nature and role as a set of specific political practices. Lending a postcolonial perspective to the global study of populism, Ranabir Samaddar examines the trajectory that West Bengal politics took following the end of Left Front rule in 2011.

Through a fragmented narrative structure that builds on commentaries on contemporary events, which highlight the recent history of populism in West Bengal, the volume explores how populism works around the 'crisis of representation' in democracy by centring the subaltern and constructing a 'people'; the problematic figure of the 'citizen'; popular engagements with the Constitution; the city as a crucial site of contemporary populism; the role of gender in populist governance; and the counter-intuitive economic logic of the populists.

The volume studies various modes of populism—elections, the language of populist politics, and the rampant 'illegalism' in populist conduct, and asks key questions: Has there ever been any democracy without populism, or any nationalism without its populist articulation? Can we think of the popular and the people without the populist? Is populism a form of subaltern resistance to neoliberal depredations? Scholars and students of Indian politics, political historians, journalists, policy makers, and informed readers will find this volume riveting.

Peggy Levitt, Erica Dobbs, Ken Chih-Yan Sun, and Ruxandra Paul
Transnational Social Protection: Social Welfare in a World on the Move
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, 224 pp., ISBN-13: 9780197666838



The idea that social rights are something we are eligible for based on where we live or where we are citizens is out-of-date. In *Transnational Social Protection*, Peggy Levitt, Erica

Dobbs, Ken Chih-Yan Sun, and Ruxandra Paul consider what happens to social welfare when more and more people live, work, study, and retire outside their countries of citizenship and, therefore,

are no longer entitled to state-sponsored health, education, and elder care. We use the concept of resource environment to capture how migrants and their families piece together packages of protections from multiple sources in multiple settings, although their ability to do so varies unequally by race, class and citizenship status. This new transnational social protection regime complements, supplements, or, in some cases, substitutes for traditional national social welfare systems. It redistributes inequalities rather than ameliorating them because accessing transnational social protection for some happens at the expense of protection for others.

John Keane
The Shortest History of Democracy
Melbourne: Black Inc., 2022, 240 pp., ISBN-10: 1760642568, ISBN-13: 9781760642563



In a time of grave uncertainty about the future of our planet, the radical potential of democracy is more important than ever. From its beginnings in Syria-Mesopotamia—and not

Athens—to its role in fomenting revolutionary fervour in France and America, democracy has subverted fixed ways of deciding who should enjoy power and privilege, and why. For democracy encourages people to do something radical—to come together as equals, to determine their own lives and futures.

In this vigorous, illuminating history, acclaimed political thinker John Keane traces its byzantine history, from the age of assembly democracy in Athens, to European-inspired electoral democracy and the birth of representative government, to our age of monitory democracy. He gives new reasons why democracy is a precious global ideal, and shows that as the world has come to be shaped by democracy, it has grown more worldly—American-style liberal democracy is giving way to regional varieties with a local character in places such as Taiwan, India, Senegal and South Africa.

In an age of cascading crises, we need the radical potential of democracy more than ever. Does it have a future, or will the demagogues and despots win? We are about to find out.

Teresa Baron
The Philosopher's Guide to Parenthood: Storks, Surrogates, and Stereotypes
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, 218 pp., ISBN-10: 1009299247, ISBN-13: 9781009299244



Our understanding of what it means to be a parent in any given context is shaped by our biological, social, legal, and moral concepts of parenthood. These are themselves subject to the

influence of changing expectations, as new technologies are produced, cultural views of the family are transformed, and laws shift in response. In this book Teresa Baron provides a detailed and incisive overview of the key questions, widespread presuppositions, and dominant approaches in the field of philosophy of parenthood. Baron examines paradigm cases and problem cases alike through an interdisciplinary lens, bringing philosophy of parenthood into dialogue with research on family-making and childrearing from across the social sciences and humanities. Her book aims to answer old questions, draw out new questions, and interrogate notions that we often take for granted in this field, including the very concept of parenthood itself.

Vienna Humanities Festival 2023 Promise And Temptations — Verführtes Denken

'May you live in interesting times!' runs a famous curse. And there is certainly nothing boring about the world we now live in. In the past twelve months, we have been absorbing the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war and managing its economic fallout. But the world has also been grappling with the advances in Artificial Intelligence. ChatGPT and other highly complex programs mimicking

human neural networks threaten to turn society upside down. The promise of these technologies is enormous, but so is the temptation to outsource human creativity to machines.

These moments of dramatic and rapid change often produce the most colorful but also the most dangerous characters, promising easy political and economic

routes out of the crisis: simple solutions which deny complexity, seeking scapegoats, the closing down of reasoned discourse, and a retreat from collective approaches of narrow winner-takes-all solutions.

Artificial Intelligence and other technological breakthroughs may help overcome the immense challenges posed by the pandemic, the climate emergency, and Russia's brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But there are no guarantees. These technologies could take us in strange and even unimagined directions.

At this year's Vienna Humanities Festival, we are looking at promises made in the past—some realized, some revealed as fantasy and even nightmares. We look at the promises being made at the moment: how to escape war; how to manage economic decline; how to battle climate change; how to resist autocracy and intolerance. We will ask which solutions being offered are illusions and which offer real hope.

Some of the world's leading writers, artists, scientists, economists, and public intellectuals consider how we might free ourselves from the anxiety which pervades contemporary society, fulfill our promises and avoid temptation.

The Vienna Humanities Festival will take place from Monday September 25 to Sunday October 1, 2023.

This festival is a cooperation between the Institute for Human Sciences and The European Network of Houses for Debate "Time to Talk". More information and an updated schedule of events will be available on the Festival and IWM websites: www.humanitiesfestival.at and www.iwm.at



King Zog, Vienna, and the World of Political Murder

BY ROBERT C. AUSTIN

King Zog, Albania's only homegrown king, picked up where others left off in continuing a cycle of political murder—one that almost caught up with him in Vienna in 1931. Luckily for him, but not his opponents, he survived. Afterward, Zog was more determined than ever to eliminate those who had opposed him, making murders and suicides a regular feature of Albania's twentieth century.

Few remember that in February 1931 the relatively new King of the Albanians was almost assassinated in front of the Vienna Opera. By then, assassinations were almost mainstream in Albanian political life. This tendency worsened when the communists took power in 1944 and the cycle of revenge intensified.

In 1931, King Zog was making his first foreign trip since receiving the rubber stamp of approval from a parliament of landowners eager to preserve Albania's feudal stability and declaring himself king in 1928. According to local propaganda, Albanians were natural monarchists and he was merely responding to the "will of the people."

Barely three years into his reign, Zog's best days were behind him. Before, he had been undoubtedly Albania's most successful politician. He had fought in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) at the age of seventeen, and then on the side of Austria-Hungary in the First World War. When Albania regained independence after the war, he served as interior minister, prime minister, and president before becoming king just before he turned 33.

Being king seemed to suit Zog. He built a small royal court and a few palaces. He was devoted to his mother, who took the title of queen mother and was also the royal food taster. His six sisters left behind village life in central Albania to become princesses, buying the clothes to match their new status and to burnish Zog's image as a committed Westernizer like Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His one nephew became the prince of Kosova. As the new kingdom was largely scorned by other countries, Zog was left to his own devices and received few foreign visitors. Despite the laziness that had set in, he likened himself to Napoleon for reasons known only to him.

As king, he needed a queen but there seemed to be few potential consorts that met his standards and Europe's established dynasties shunned him. By then, agreements with Italy had reduced Albania to a mere satellite and Zog was lavishly bribed to ensure that Benito Mussolini got everything he wanted. Mussolini was determined to reverse the fact that Italy had won the First World War but lost the peace and Albania was destined to be his colony, or more precisely a holiday destination for Italians.



Undated painting of Zog the First, King of the Albanians by Spiro Xega.

Zog's kingdom was not that dissimilar from other states between the wars, with lots of talk about lofty ideals but ruled largely as a protection racket so as to avoid social revolution at all costs. Zog invested more in the survival of his monarchy and the trappings of the kingdom than in schools or the draining of swamps.

Zog's decision to go to Vienna had three unofficial motives. First, he loved the Austrian capital. He had visited toward the end of the war in a kind of house arrest as the Austrians held him and several other Al-

banian notables to later use them for a new government, should Austria-Hungary win the war. This first visit may well have inspired his decision to make Albania a kingdom. Second, he was in poor health due to constant smoking and living a sedentary existence largely hiding out in a Tirana palace in fear of assassination. Third, he had a lover in Vienna.

Once in Vienna, Zog was determined to make an impression. He stayed more than a month. He bought things and showered gifts on his lover and her sister. Zog was

desperate to be recognized. The local Mercedes dealership loaned him a car in the hope he would buy a fleet for his government. He wanted to hear the locals say: "There goes the Albanian king."

Zog was not the only Albanian in town. Vienna had become the key place for refugees from his authoritarianism and his enemies could not have been happier that he had decided to visit. The fact that he spent so much money in the city really irked them. Zog was hardly one of the greatest criminals in power between the two world wars, but he certainly had earned the enmity of hundreds for his jailings and executions.

Zog's meteoric rise had been possible because his uncle, Esad Pasha Toptani, was the victim of a daylight assassination on a Paris street in 1920. The assassin, Avni Rustemi, was fined only one symbolic franc by a Paris court that ended up putting Esad Pasha's reputation as a disreputable Balkan warlord on trial. He went home, where he was treated like a hero. It was widely assumed that it was Zog who ordered his assassination in Tirana in 1924.

As prime minister and later president, Zog hired hitmen to kill some of his major opponents, particularly the members of the revolutionary government that had briefly ousted him in June 1924. He probably got Mussolini's approval to have one former cabinet minister murdered in Bari in 1925, and then one of the key leaders of the Kosovars in the same year and his own brother-in-law in Prague in 1927.

But Zog still had a few notable enemies alive and well in Vienna. The Austrian police kept tabs on them and told them to lie low during the king's visit or face deportation.

Zog took some suites at the Hotel Imperial on the Ringstrasse. He put the two sisters up at the Regina Hotel near the Votivkirche. On February 20, Zog was headed for the third night in a row to the opera, where he always got the best possible box. The women were to meet him later at a bar. Zog always parked his Mercedes in the most visible place for maximum attention. It was always easy to find out where he was.

The assassination attempt was planned principally by Hassan Prishtina, an extremely devoted Albanian nationalist from Kosovo who rejected Zog's casual abandonment of its cause, among other things. Two enlisted men were to carry out the act

while the planners watched from the café in the Hotel Bristol, across the street from the opera. Zog left early with three other men. As soon as he exited, the shooting started. His bodyguards fired back. His key bodyguard was killed but Zog was not even hit. A local mob descended on the assassins. Zog skipped his date and went back to his hotel.

The Vienna tabloid press was livid that Albanians had so brazenly abused Austrian hospitality. There was talk of reinstating the death penalty. The two assassins were seized as the police arrested every other Albanian they could find. Zog told the press that he was relieved that no Austrians had been harmed. He got some of the recognition he wanted when Foreign Minister Johannes Schober visited and Germany's President Paul von Hindenburg sent a "get well soon" telegram. Disingenuously, Zog blamed Serbs for the whole thing. Given Zog's love of cash bribes, Mussolini was likely relieved at not losing his client.

The trial that followed was taken out of "leftist" Vienna for fear that it might inspire a repeat of Rustemi's Paris trial by putting Zog and even Austrian foreign policy on trial. It took place in Reid, west of the capital, under very tight security given the assumed Albanian propensity for violence. The defendants documented the plundering of the country and the extravagance of the Vienna visit. The sentences were light, ranging between two and three years. Zog organized further trials in absentia in Albania, where family members of the plotters faced a much worse outcome. The mastermind Prishtina escaped the police round-up and ended up in Thessaloniki hiding from Zog's emissaries. In August 1933, he was murdered.

Ignoring his doctors' advice that he should head to the Alps for recovery after the attack, Zog went home. He never voluntarily left Albania again. In April 1939, he was forced to flee when Italy invaded. That began twenty-two years of exile that ended when Zog died in France in 1961. His murdered and exiled opponents would become heroes for the communists, who blew up Zog's hometown castle in Burgajet. ◀

Robert C. Austin is associate director of the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto. He is a guest at the IWM in 2023.